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Abstract
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of the dominant discourse on linkages, which
focuses on whether World Trade Organization (“WTO”) rules should be modified (or interpreted)
to permit trade restrictions on environmental and labor rights grounds. Those fully familiar with
the competing conventional approaches to trade-environment and trade-labor debates may either
skim Part I or move directly to Part II. Parts II through V examine the political economy of trade-
environment and trade-labor policy, particularly in the United States. Part II addresses the politics
of trade-environment agenda setting and the reasons why U.S. critics more likely direct their criti-
cism at the WTO instead of environmental policy decisions made domestically. Part III turns to the
trade-labor linkage, again assessing the domestic politics behind the predominant focus on trade
restrictions. It examines the apparent paradox (at first blush) that the demand for binding WTO
labor norms is strongest in the United States, which arguably offers the fewest labor and social
protections in the developed world. Part IV briefly addresses what potentially could be accom-
plished multilaterally through better coordination of the roles of international trade, development,
and other economic institutions. Part V concludes with a discussion of the nexus between U.S.
domestic politics and the WTO’s future development. The links between U.S. domestic politics
and international trade-environment/trade-labor policy help compose the WTO’s blue-green blues.
WTO BLUE-GREEN BLUES: THE IMPACT OF
U.S. DOMESTIC POLITICS ON TRADE-
LABOR, TRADE-ENVIRONMENT LINKAGES
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Gregory Shaffer*
INTRODUCTION
While scores of Western commentators criticize the non-
transparency' of the World Trade Organization 2 ("WTO") in
their examination of "blue" trade-labor and "green" trade-environ-
ment issues, they often ignore the linkage between domestic
politics in powerful states and international trade measures.
Consciously or unconsciously, they blur this crucial linkage that
divides WTO members and exacerbates conflicts and propels
them to the WTO in the first place. Yet it is this underlying do-
mestic-international, two-level game3 that also needs to be made
more transparent, since its examination demonstrates that it is
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. Correspondence e-mail:
gshaffer@facstaff.wisc.edu. Thanks go to Jeff Atik, Peter Carstensen, Steve Charnovitz,
Jon Graubart, Robert Hudec, PaulJoffe, Neil Komesar, Kal Raustiala, and David Trubek
for their cogent comments, and to Steven Coon, Jon Graubart, and Monica Riederer
for valuable research assistance. All errors, of course, remain my own.
1. The term "transparency" is a buzzword used in public discourse to assess public
access-or lack thereof-to deliberations and dispute settlement hearings within the
World Trade Organization ("WTO") over trade and trade-related policies. This public
access could be either (i) direct, through the provision of access of non-governmental
groups to WTO negotiating rooms, committee meetings and dispute settlement hear-
ings, or (ii) indirect, through making the minutes of meetings and transcripts of hear-
ings, as well as all position papers, secretariat studies, and legal briefs submitted to
them, publicly available over the Internet and by other media on an expeditious basis.
2. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, LEGAL IN-
STRUMENTS-REsULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter WTO Agreement].
3. Domestic politics remains the primary explanation for national negotiating po-
sitions in international fora, even though in some areas transnational advocacy groups
can successfully act outside of national politics and international organizations such as
the WTO can somewhat constrain national policymaking. See Robert D. Putman, Diplo-
macy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427 (1988) (dis-
cussing two-level game theory in international relations); DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY:
INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1993).
For an application to the WTO, see, e.g., Gregory Shaffer, The World Trade Organization
Under Challenge: Democracy and the Law and Politics of the WTO's Treatment of Trade and
Environment Matters, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Shaffer, W"O Under
Challenge].
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this nexus more than the WTO's lack of transparency that results
in trade-environment and trade-labor conflicts. 4
This Article makes two central points about debates over the
WTO's treatment of trade-environment and trade-labor matters.
First, the U.S. public is relatively government-averse and for-
eigner-wary. The United States is thus far less likely to support
financing of domestic and international programs that directly
address environmental and social concerns than to support
trade restrictions against imports. Trade restrictions against im-
ports impose costs on domestic constituents, but these costs are
less transparent than the costs of positive programs. Domestic
politicians and the mass public, therefore, respond more favora-
bly to critics' calls for trade restrictions against unrepresented
foreigners. WTO critics employ the rhetoric of fighting "mul-
tinational corporations,"5 but the sanctions that they advocate
can harm developing-country workers and these workers are
rarely consulted about them. Positive assistance programs, on
the other hand, are both more efficient and equitable. Yet,
whatever political party is in control, domestic political processes
prefer to shift costs through trade restrictions onto foreigners
who, in a world of asymmetric power, tend to come from poorer,
smaller countries.6 The result is North-South trade-social pol-
4. Social policy conflicts brought before the WTO are best explained by a more
complex combination of factors, including the following: (i) the increasing importance
of trade vis-A-vis domestic output in most WTO members, (ii) the overall lowering of
tariffs and protectionist barriers worldwide so that protectionist interests look to new
means to protect home markets from international competition, (iii) a shift in negotiat-
ing power in favor of capital against labor and environmental activists at the domestic
level so that the latter attempt to restrict imports in order to reduce firms' negotiating
leverage and exit options, (iv) different social priorities of constituencies around the
world so that, for example, preservationist environmental policies are of less impor-
tance to developing-country non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") and constitu-
ents than to their developed country counterparts, and (v) conflicting national interests
in a world characterized by asymmetric economic power in which developing countries
fear that trade restrictions on alleged social policy grounds will be used primarily (or
exclusively) against their exports because only economically powerful countries, such as
the United States, will have the leverage to effectively implement them.
5. See, e.g., LORI WALLACH & MICHELLE SFORZA, WHOSE TRADE ORGANIZATION? COR-
PORATE GLOBALIZATION AND THE EROSION OF DEMOCRAcY, at ix (1999) (referring in the
preface by Ralph Nader to "an autocratic system of international governance that favors
corporate interests").
6. The WTO Shrimp-Turtle Case took place during a Democratic presidency and a
Republican-controlled Congress, while the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT"), Tuna-Dolphin Case took place during a Republican presidency and a Demo-
cratic-controlled Congress. See United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
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icy controversies brought before the WTO because of the United
States' imposition of unilateral trade restrictions against develop-
ing-country imports, as opposed to negotiated package agree-
ments involving financial and technical assistance.7
Second, domestic laissez-faire-oriented policies within the
United States, whether concerning labor and social policy or en-
vironmental protection, should encourage further backlash
against the WTO and the international trade liberalization poli-
cies that it facilitates. Although it is primarily these domestic
policies that exacerbate income inequality within the United
States, political processes more easily focus on trade liberaliza-
tion as the culprit. To attempt to counter this backlash, trade-
liberals could work with environmental and labor advocates to
address their concerns through specific domestic and interna-
tional environmental and social programs. This policy response,
however, is constrained by U.S. domestic politics for the reasons
just stated. Thus, should the United States continue to push for
trade liberalization policies without more coherently addressing
domestic and international environmental and social concerns,
it should trigger further backlash against the international trad-
ing regime.
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of the domi-
nant discourse on linkages, which focuses on whether WTO
rules should be modified (or interpreted) to permit trade re-
strictions on environmental and labor rights grounds. Those
fully familiar with the competing conventional approaches to
trade-environment and trade-labor debates may either skim Part
I or move directly to Part II.
Parts II through V examine the political economy of trade-
environment and trade-labor policy, particularly in the United
States. Part II addresses the politics of trade-environment
agenda setting and the reasons why U.S. critics more likely direct
Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [here-
inafter Shrimp-Turtle Case]; United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT B.I.S.D.
39S/155 (Sept. 3, 1991) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin Case]. In both cases, a coalition of
environmental activists, together with producers seeking a level playing field brought
an action to compel the United States to implement a ban that triggered the GATT/
WTO proceedings. In both GATT/WTO cases, the U.S. position on the appropriate-
ness of trade sanctions on environmental grounds was basically the same.
7. Package agreements, of course, could be combined with monitoring and, even-
tually, trade restrictions, whether through market boycotts, adverse labeling, tariffs, or
import bans.
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their criticism at the WTO instead of environmental policy deci-
sions made domestically. Part III turns to the trade-labor
linkage, again assessing the domestic politics behind the pre-
dominant focus on trade restrictions. It examines the apparent
paradox (at first blush) that the demand for binding WTO labor
norms is strongest in the United States, which arguably offers the
fewest labor and social protections in the developed world. Part
IV briefly addresses what potentially could be accomplished mul-
tilaterally through better coordination of the roles of interna-
tional trade, development, and other economic institutions.
Part V concludes with a discussion of the nexus between U.S.
domestic politics and the WTO's future development. The links
between U.S. domestic politics and international trade-environ-
ment/trade-labor policy help compose the WTO's blue-green
blues.
I. THE CURRENT FOCUS ON TRADE-SOCIAL POLICY
LINKAGES: SHOULD WTO RULES FACILITATE TRADE
RESTRICTIONS ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND LABOR
RIGHTS GROUNDS?
A. Overview of the Debates
The World Trade Organization is increasingly a household
name, not because of the almost half century of multilateral
trade negotiations leading to its current state, nor because of its
multiple daily committee meetings in Geneva, but because of the
dramatic anti-WTO protests and riots in Seattle, Washington in
November 1999 at the WTO's third Ministerial Meeting.' The
two central claims of the protestors were, first, that the WTO
system favors large corporate interests at the expense of workers,
consumers, the environment, and developing countries; and sec-
ond, that it is a closed, trade-biased, anti-democratic institution.
Critics link these substantive and procedural claims, declaring
that it is the non-transparent procedures of the WTO that lead
to pro-corporate, neo-liberal outcomes.
The preferred remedy of many of these critics is trade re-
strictions on labor and environmental grounds. I call this the
western perspective because it is almost solely a demand of western
8. Mark Barrett, Trade Anger Reverberates; Issues Impact WNC, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN-
TIMES, Dec. 2, 1999, at Al (remarking that "[b]efore this week, you might have thought
the WTO was a wrestling organization seen on a cable channel you don't get").
2000]
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nations and western constituents.9 This does not in itself signify
that the demand for trade restrictions is correct or incorrect, but
rather that the situation's political economy needs to be recog-
nized. Although developing-country critics of the WTO demand
fewer WTO constraints on their abilities to implement social and
development policies, 10 they largely oppose trade restrictions on
environmental and labor grounds, particularly where they would
be implemented through a unilateral determination by the
United States. 1 On the other hand, Western protestors, West-
ern academics, and often Western leaders and the Western me-
dia call for WTO authorization of unilaterally determined trade
restrictions without any significant complementary financial as-
sistance. Well before the Seattle concatenations, reams of U.S.
law review articles addressed how WTO rules should be modified
9. For a detailed study of this issue in the environmental realm, see, e.g., Shaffer,
WI'O Under Challenge, supra note 3 (assessing how NGOs from developing countries
support their governments' opposition to amendment of WTO rules that would facili-
tate unilateral trade restrictions on environmental grounds). The terms "western" and
"northern" are used in this Article to distinguish developed country positions from
those of the developing world. In many cases, U.S. politicians, academics, and interest
groups play leading roles among developed country constituencies in pressing for trade
sanctions on social and environmental grounds, so that this also could be dubbed a U.S.
perspective. This, of course, does not mean that all constituencies around the globe
can be divided on this basis, but the political economy of the situation is clear to any
careful observer.
10. For example, developing-country critics demand that developing countries be
granted special status so that they retain more discretion to promote "infant industries"
and other policies through subsidies and import barriers than under WTO rules.
11. See, e.g., Third World Intellectuals and NGOs Statement Against Linkage (TWIN-
SAL), ECONOMIQUiTy 2 (Nov. 1999), available at http://www.cuts-india.org/Twin-
sal.htm (listing, in newsletter of Indian organization Centre for International Trade,
Economics and Environment ("CUTS"), 99 third world intellectuals and NGOs as signa-
tories and declaring "our unambiguous opposition to Linkage of Labour and Environ-
mental Standards to WTO and to trade treaties"). "We also wish to disabuse the media
and the governments in the developed countries of the notion that those who oppose
Linkage are corporate interests and malign governments." Id. They propose that labor
and environmental issues be handled in labor and environmental agencies, such as the
International Labour Organization and the United Nations Environmental Pro-
gramme. Id.; see also Joint NGO Statement on Issues and Proposals for the WfO Ministerial
Conference 8-11, available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/issue-cn.htm [hereinafter
Joint Statement] (signed by 34 NGOs from developing countries, including Ban-
gladesh, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Ke-
nya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nepal, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Uruguay, and
Zimbabwe). This Joint Statement asserts that "the environment should not be made
use of as an issue for protectionism by the powerful for that would unfairly shift the
adjustment cost to the weaker countries and people ... There should be no recourse to
unilateral trade actions for any purpose." Id. The statement also rejects "the idea of
introducing labour standards or a 'social clause."' Id.
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or interpreted to accommodate trade restrictions imposed on
environmental grounds.12 In response to the Seattle mayhem,
U.S. President Clinton called for mandatory trade "sanctions"
against countries that fail to implement core labor standards.
13
The U.S. media likewise supported some of the protesters' de-
mands. The New York Times' lead editorial concluded that WTO
dispute settlement panels "should bend over backward to side
with the environmental advocates when the cause is just and not
a disguised form of protectionism." 4 These western political
and media leaders, however, ignore developing-country claims
that the cause is not just if no financial assistance is provided to
them, 15 and that self-interested producers are always in league
with well-meaning environmental activists when it comes to bans
on the importation of developing countries' competitive prod-
ucts.
B. Overview of WTO Rules: The Product-Process Distinction
WTO law prohibits discriminatory regulatory treatment of
12. See, e.g., Jeffrey Dunoff, The Death of the Trade Regime, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 733
(1999) (proposing new procedural mechanisms whereby WTO dispute settlement
panels would avoid controversial trade-environment cases on standing, ripeness, politi-
cal question, and related grounds, thereby permitting domestic trade restrictions im-
posed on environmental grounds to remain unchallenged before the WTO); see also
Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 Nw. U. L. Rv. 658, 660 (1996) (proposing
the creation of "an exception that would allow certain laws or actions to exist even if
they violate the rules of the World Trade Organization"). This exception would be
available provided that "the impediment to trade must be incidental" and the measure
must be "enacted or undertaken for the purpose of reflecting an underlying societal
value." Id.; DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE Fu-
TURE 113-36 (1994) (proposing a three-prong test to address trade-environment issues
in more balanced manner); Robert Howse & Donald Regan, The Product/Process Distinc-
tion-An Illusory Basis for Disciplining 'Unitateralism'in Trade Policy, 11 EUR.J. INT'L L. 249
(2000) (maintaining that WTO rules already permit countries to differentiate and re-
strict products based on how they are produced).
13. Steven Greenhouse & Joseph Kahn, Talks and Turmoil: Workers'Rights; U.S. Ef-
fort to Add Labor Standards to Agenda Fails, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1999, at Al (referring to a
Seattle Post-Intelligencer interview in which U.S. President Clinton stated, "tu]ltimately
I would favor a system in which sanctions would come for violating any provision of a
trade agreement"). President Clinton was responding to broader U.S. public views. Id.
See, e.g., Globalization: What Americans Are Worried About, Bus. WK., Apr. 24, 2000, at 44
(noting that 80% of U.S. citizens polled said protecting environment should be major
priority of U.S. trade agreements and 74% said it should be major priority of trade
agreements to prevent unfair competition by countries that violate workers' rights).
14. Messages for the WTO, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1999, at A30.
15. See, e.g., Jeffrey Atik, Two Hopeful Readings of Shrimp-Turtle, 9 Y.B. INT'L ENVrL.
L. 6 (1999).
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foreign products by WTO members, 16 subject to certain condi-
tioned exceptions, such as those "necessary to protect public
morals" and "human, animal, or plant life or health," provided
that the measures do not constitute "arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination."' 7 In the consumer health field, the WTO
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures' 8 supple-
ments these provisions. Among other matters, it permits coun-
tries to maintain sanitary and phytosanitary requirements higher
than internationally agreed standards so long as they are based
on a risk assessment and do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably dis-
criminate between Members.19 Under this approach, domestic
clean air regulations cannot apply more stringent standards to
foreign-produced gasoline than to domestically-produced gaso-
line. z° Similarly, domestic health agencies cannot apply more
stringent pesticide testing requirements to imported apples. Ap-
ples are apples and must be treated the same, whether they are
produced in the United States, Chile, orJapan, whether they are
Red Delicious or Granny Smith.
GATT judicial interpretations of these provisions tradition-
ally distinguished between product and non-product related pro-
duction and process methods.21 Apple growers, for example,
can adopt widely different production processes. They could
16. GATT art. 111(4), for example, provides the following:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the terri-
tory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less
favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of
all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
17. See GATT art. XX (setting forth these conditions).
18. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr.
15, 1994, VTO Agreement, Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/le-
gal_e/final_e.htm.
19. ld. art. 2, 3, 5; see also European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS26/13 (Feb. 19, 1998).
20. See United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasolines, Report of
the Appellate Body, WT/DS2/9 (May 20, 1996) (upholding finding of panel that im-
ported and domestic gasoline were "like products," and that, since imported gasoline
was treated "less favorably" than domestic gasoline, discriminatory U.S. regulations were
inconsistent with GATT Article 111(4)).
21. See, e.g., Joel P. Trachtman, Decision: GATT Dispute Settlement Panel, 86 Am. J.
INT'L. L. 142, 142-43 (1992) (discussing briefly relevant GATT articles III, XI, and XX
and their application in the first Tuna-Dolphin Case). This approach, however, has been
called into question somewhat by the WTO Shrimp-Turtle Case. See also Gregory Shaffer,
International Decision: United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Prod-
ucts, 93 Am. J. INT'L L. 507 (1999) [hereinafter Shaffer, Shrimp-Turtle Dispute].
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employ non-unionized or child labor, or use genetically modi-
fied seeds or a cocktail of pesticides and fertilizers. Under the
traditional GATT approach, to the extent that production
processes affect the safety of the product itself, WTO members
may ban imports so long as they treat domestic products no
more favorably. Where, however, there is no danger from the
product's importation or consumption (for example, no pesti-
cide or fertilizer remains on the fruit), then a WTO member
may not ban it's importation, regardless of the exporting coun-
try's domestic regulations and regardless of the actual produc-
tion methods used.2 2 This view treats the use of child and non-
unionized labor, or biotechnological and traditional agricultural
techniques, in a similar manner as soil and climate differences.
Together, such differences determine a country's comparative
advantage to produce certain types of products as opposed to
others.2 3
22. Traditional GATT doctrine considers such an imported product to be a "like"
product, which cannot be subjected to more stringent regulations. The notion of a
"like product" is, nonetheless, a rather fluid concept in GATT and WTO jurisprudence.
See, e.g., Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS8/
AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996). The Appellate Body stated in its Japan-Alcohol decision:
No one approach to exercising judgement will be appropriate for all cases...
The concept of 'likeness' is a relative one that evokes the image of an accor-
dion. The accordion of 'likeness' stretches and squeezes in different places as
different provisions of the WTO Agreement are applied. The width of the
accordion in any one of those places must be determined by the particular
provision in which the term 'like' is encountered as well as by the context and
the circumstances that prevail in any given case to which that provision may
apply.
Id.
This GATT approach, however, can potentially conflict with other international treaty
provisions. For example, the regulation of genetically modified seeds is also governed
by the 2000 Biosafety Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity. See Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Feb. 23, 2000, art. 1,
available at http://www.biodiv.org/biosafe/protocol.asp [hereinafter Biosafety Proto-
col]. The Biosafety Protocol subjects import restrictions to a risk analysis, yet in doing
so, grants importing countries greater discretion to restrict imports based on scientific
uncertainty. For a review of the positions of GMOs supporters and critics, as well as an
overview of the Biosafety Protocol, see generally Mark Pollack & Gregory Shaffer, Bio-
technology: The Next Transatlantic Trade War?, 23 WASH. U. L. Q. 41 (2000).
23. The traditional factors of production that determine a country's comparative
advantage are land, labor, and capital. While human beings and the natural environ-
ment clearly are more than "factors of production," the issue remains as to which is the
relatively better means, among imperfect alternatives, to address their plights and who
should determine those means. Some who support environmental and social policy
negotiations at the international level as a counterpart to liberalized trade policy none-
theless oppose the integration of environmental and labor standards into the WTO.
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C. The Traditional Trade-Liberal Approach
Supporters of the traditional trade liberal approach main-
tain that labor and environmental standards are fundamentally a
matter of domestic policy to be determined by domestic political
processes. Many of them favor a regulatory competition model
whereby environmental and labor standards constitute domestic
political choices that form part of a country's comparative advan-
tage.2'4 They base their arguments on concepts of federalism (in
the United States) and subsidiarity (in the European Union),
whereby decision-making is to be made at a level closest to the
citizen. Under a regulatory competition model, when consum-
ers purchase products on the market, they effectively choose a
regulatory system under which those products are produced,
leading to competition between regulatory systems and (these
commentators argue) more efficient, better regulation.25
While critics charge that the regulatory competition model
leads to downward competitive pressure on environmental and
social standards, 26 defenders counter that, in the international
These commentators argue that the 'ATO is a relatively effective trade institution and
should not address areas outside of its competence. If environmental and labor stan-
dards are to be set and enforced at the international level, they argue, this should be
done through international labor and environmental organizations, such as the Inter-
national Labor Organization ("ILO"), the United Nations Environmental Programme
("UNEP"), or a new Global Environmental Organization.
24. See generally REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (Daniel C.
Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 2000).
25. See, e.g., Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64J. POL. ECON.
416, 418-20 (1956) (presenting what is known as Tiebout model, which maintains that
ability of individuals-or in our case, firms-to "vote with their feet" leads to efficient
allocation of local public goods); see also application to U.S. domestic environmental
regulation in Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-
to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1212
(1992) (arguing that competition should not decrease social welfare, but rather "pro-
duce an efficient allocation of industrial activity among the states"). Cf Richard Revesz,
Federalism and Regulation: Extrapolating from the Analysis of Environmental Regulation in the
United States, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 219, 224-26 (2000) (noting that there are stronger
arguments "for allowing countries to impose environmentally-based trade measures, in
particular where there are physical spillovers or global commons issues and centralized
regulation is not feasible").
26. See, e.g., RAVEENDRA N. BATRA, THE MYrH OF FREE TRADE: A PLAN FOR
AMERICA'S ECONOMIC REVIVAL (1993); Herman Daly, From Adjustment to Sustainable Devel-
opment: The Obstacle of Free Trade, 15 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 33 (1992); see also Esty,
supra note 12, at 107 (noting the effect of a "political drag," that is, "where a country
with low environmental standards is perceived as having established a competitive ad-
vantage for its producers based on lower environmental compliance costs, companies
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context, many of these critics erroneously focus on a country's
absolute advantage instead of its comparative advantageY.2  Al-
though companies can produce a product at a cheaper cost in
jurisdictions with lax labor and environmental standards, a low-
wage, low-standard country cannot produce all products con-
sumed in the world. Similarly, a country with higher standards
cannot import everything and produce nothing for export.
Rather, a country can have an absolute advantage in nothing
(whether on account of low skills, high social standards, or oth-
erwise) and its citizens still benefit through trade vis-a-vis the al-
ternative of an inward-looking, autarchic domestic system.28
Even where they admit that there is a theoretical case for
potential downward pressure on wages and standards,2 9 defend-
competing in the global market against these producers may pressure their own govern-
ments to lower standards to even the 'playing field"').
27. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Elliott, Getting Beyond No... ! Promoting Worker Rights and
Trade, in THE WTO AFTER SEATrLE 187, 197-98 (JeffreyJ. Schott ed., 2000) (comment-
ing that "theoretical studies suggest that there is no systematic relationship between
core labor standards and comparative advantage, while empirical studies suggest any
effect is probably small in magnitude"); see alsoJagdish Bhagwati, Trade Liberalisation and
"Fair Trade" Demands: Addressing the Environmental and Labour Standards Issues, in A
STREAM OF WINDOWS: WESTERN REFLECTIONS ON TRADE, IMMIGRATION, AND DEMOCRACY
247, 251 (Jagdish Bhagwati ed., 1998) [hereinafter Bhagwati, Trade Liberalisation];
Jagdish Bhagwati, The Agenda of the WIO, in CHALLENGES TO THE NEW WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION 27-59 (Pitou von Dijck & Gerrit Faber eds., 1996); T.N. Srinivasan, Inter-
national Trade and Labour Standards from an Economic Perspective, in CHALLENGES TO THE
NEW WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION supra, at 219-44. Cf David Leebron, Lying Down with
Procrustes: An Analysis of Harmonization Claims, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION:
PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? 41, 60-61 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert Hudec eds.,
1996) [hereinafter Bhagwati & Hudec, FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION] (noting claim
that low standards constitute a form of "subsidy" and not a "real" comparative advan-
tage).
28. The theory of comparative advantage is ultimately based on relative productiv-
ity. What matters to investing firms is not wages nor regulatory compliance costs by
themselves, but rather the relative productivity of all factors of production in a given
jurisdiction. For overviews of the theory of comparative advantage, see PAUL R. KIUG-
MAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY 14-24 (4th
ed., 1997) [hereinafter KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD]; JAN PEN, A PRIMER ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE (1967); PAUL R. KRUGMAN, PoP INTERNATIONALISM 79-80 (1996) (mocking histo-
rian Paul Kennedy for his remark, "[w]hat if there is nothing you can produce more
cheaply or efficiently than anywhere else, except by constantly cutting labor costs").
Krugman notes that Kennedy's remarks reenact the classic fallacy of confusing compara-
tive advantage with absolute advantage. Id.
29. See, e.g., John Douglas Wilson, Capital Mobility and Environmental Standards: Is
There a Theoretical Basis for a Race to the Bottom, in 1 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION:
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 393, 396 Uagdish Bhagwati & Robert Hudec eds., 1996) [hereinaf-
ter ECONOMIC ANALYSIS] (stating that "the theoretical case for a race to the bottom is
mixed at best").
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ers of the regulatory competition model maintain that there is
little to no empirical evidence that this is occurring. 30 As regards
environmental protection, polluting industries have not, in fact,
shifted operations to the developing world to any significant ex-
tent.31 Rather, liberalized trade appears to have helped leverage
up standards, not ratchet them down, through informal
means.32 The system's defenders similarly assert that there is lit-
tle hard evidence that trade is leading to downward pressure on
wages for unskilled labor in northern countries. 3
Moreover, trade-liberals argue that the surest means to
ratchet up standards in developing countries is to foster eco-
nomic growth, particularly through open trade. 34 As the econo-
mist Paul Krugman writes, "The raw fact is that every successful
30. See, e.g., Bhagwati, Trade Liberalisation, supra note 27, at 53.
31. See, e.g., HAAN NORDSTFOM & Sco'vr VAUGHAN, WTO, SPECIAL STUDIES No. 4:
TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT (Oct. 14, 1999), available at http://www.wto.org ("Little evi-
dence bears out claim that polluting industries tend to migrate from developed to de-
veloping countries to reduce environmental compliance costs."); see also International
Trade and the Environment, WORLD BANK DISCUSSION PAPERS, No. 159 (Patrick Low ed.,
1992); Arik Levinson, Environmental Regulations and Industry Location: International and
Domestic Evidence, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 38, at 453. Levinson explains the
difference between the rhetoric and the evidence, stating that "[p]oliticians receive
support from many sources, including industry groups using pollution-intensive pro-
duction processes. One convenient and inherently credible way ofjustifying favorable
treatment for these polluting industries is to argue that regulations threaten their com-
petitive position and that those industries might be forced to relocate." Id.
32. See, e.g., Werner Antweiler et al., Is Free Trade Good for the Environment?, NAT'L
BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH 6707 (1998) (concluding that "freer trade is good for the
environment"); DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULA-
TION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 5-8'(1995) (assessing how firms adapting to more stringent
regulation in jurisdictions with large markets can facilitate raising of standards glob-
ally). For a similar analysis in another area of social regulation, see Gregory Shaffer,
Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International Rules in the Ratcheting
up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALEJ. INT'L L. 1 (2000) (examining conditions under
which cross-border exchange can lead to leveraging up of social protections such as
data privacy standards).
33. See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati & Vivek Dehejia, Freer Trade and Wages of the Un-
skilled-Is Marx Striking Again?, in TRADE AND WAGES: LEVELING WAGES DowN? (Jagdish
Bhagwati & Marvin H. Kosters eds., 1994).
34. See, e.g., Drusilla Brown, A Transactions Cost Politics Analysis of International Child
Labor Standards, in SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. TRADE POLICIES 245 (Alan Deardorff &
Robert Stern eds., 2000). Similarly, a 1996 Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development ("OECD") report concludes that low labor standards play no signifi-
cant role in attracting investment, and rather, "that there is a positive association over
time between sustained trade reforms and improvements in core standards." OECD,
TRADE, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR STANDARDS: A STUDY OF CORE WORKERS' RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 12-13 (1996).
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example of economic development this past century-every case
of a poor nation that worked its way up to a more or less decent,
or at least dramatically better, standard of living-has taken
place via globalization; that is, by producing for the world mar-
ket rather than trying for self-sufficiency."" Imposing trade re-
strictions on developing-country imports may be more equitable
for unskilled workers in the United States and Europe vis-a-vis
capital, 6 but it will likely hurt the world's working poor.
D. Critical Approaches
As is true with the perspectives of the system's supporters,
the system's critics employ many arguments, not all of which are
adequately summarized here. I divide the critics into two camps,
those who oppose trade liberalization generally and those who
desire a modification or interpretation of existing trade rules to
better accommodate trade sanctions on environmental and so-
cial grounds. More radical critics assert that globalization trends
must be countered through eliminating or severely curtailing
the WTO and IMF and thereby granting importing countries full
discretion to implement trade and capital controls as they deem
appropriate, whether for protectionist or other policy reasons.37
More moderate critics support liberalized trade policies pro-
vided that they are complemented by appropriate labor and en-
vironmental regulation at the international and domestic
levels.3" A primary difference between some moderate critics
35. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 363 (2000) (quoting
Paul Rrugman, Enemies of the WFO, SLATE (Nov. 23, 1999), at http://slate.msn.com/
Dismal/99-11-23/Dismal.asp).
36. Workers in U.S. industries that depend on imported commodities and workers
in export industries may, on the other hand, be hurt by protectionist trade policies in
the United States and abroad. Labor groups, nonetheless, may be more aware of jobs
lost to imports than jobs existing or made possible through liberalized trade. In addi-
tion, workers also benefit from liberalized trade policies as consumers, but again, they
are less likely to be aware of this impact than are workers whose jobs are put at risk.
Finally, unionized labor is more concerned about unionized jobs lost to imports than
non-unionized jobs made possible through liberalized trade.
37. In my view, in a world of imperfect alternatives, this policy shift would result in
not only a significant efficiency tradeoff-reducing aggregate national and world wel-
fare-but also have perverse consequences in terms of equity, on account of curtailed
market access for developing-country products.
38. Some commentators assert that labor and environmental rules must be inte-
grated directly into the WTO itself. See, e.g., Andrew Strauss, From Gattzilla to the Green
Giant: Winning the Environmental Battle for the Soul of the World Trade Organization, 19 U.
PAJ. INT'L ECON. L. 769 (1998).
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and some defenders of the current system is that these critics
maintain that countries should be free to restrict imports on en-
vironmental and social grounds, even where multilateral stan-
dards have yet to be agreed upon, provided that they do not do
so for "predominantly" protectionist purposes.39 In this section,
I summarize the approach of these more moderate critics.
Critics of liberalized trade policies maintain that globaliza-
tion processes, facilitated by liberalized trading rules, shift nego-
tiating leverage to capital and away from labor and governmen-
tal regulators.4 ° In a world without trade barriers or investment
or capital controls, capital can threaten to invest elsewhere un-
less labor agrees to lower wages and government officials agree
to reduce regulatory controls. In the decades following the
Great Depression, labor advocates in Europe and the United
States aimed to curtail companies' ability to compete through
reducing wages and labor standards. 41 The United States and
European nations passed legislation that interfered with the la-
bor market procedurally (through empowering collective bar-
gaining) and substantively (through mandating minimum
health and safety standards, minimum wages, and other require-
ments) .42 For labor advocates, these procedural and substantive
moves somewhat offset capital's unequal bargaining power.
Globalization forces, however, firmly reintroduce market forces.
Critics claim that globalization processes, facilitated by the
WTO's legal regime, thereby buttress capital's negotiating lever-
age and undermine post-193 0 social compromises.
Critics maintain that existing GATT rules should be inter-
preted or modified to permit "legitimate" trade restrictions im-
39. See, e.g., Howse & Regan, supra note 12, at 280 (noting that a test must focus on
"dominant" purpose, since there will likely be protectionist producer support for trade
restriction).
40. See, e.g., RAvi BATRA, THE MvrH OF FREE TRADE (1993); ROBERT KUTTNER, EvE-
RY] HING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS OF MARKETS (1999); Robert Scott, Trade, in
RECLAIMING PROSPERITY: A BLUEPRINT FOR PROGRESSIVE ECONOMIC REFORM (1996); see
also DANI RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE Too FAR? 4 (1997).
41. See, e.g., Paula Voos, Labor Law Reform in RECLAIMING PROSPERITY, 123, 125
(Todd Schafer et al. eds., 1996) (referring to "taking wages out of competition"). Crit-
ics argue that international trade liberalization has contributed to reduced wages and
benefits for the unskilled in the United States and increased unemployment in Europe.
42. See, e.g., Brian Langille, General Reflections on the Relationship of Trade and Labor
(Or: Fair Trade Is Free Trade's Destiny), in Bhagwati & Hudec, FAIR TRADE AND HARMONI-
ZATION, supra note 27, at 231, 242 (noting procedural and substantive responses to "un-
equal bargaining power").
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posed unilaterally on account of foreign production processes.
They argue that the production process is an integral part of the
product ultimately consumed and that it is disingenuous to
maintain otherwise. Holes in the ozone layer and global warm-
ing so attest. Moreover, consumers do not wish to support prac-
tices that they find environmentally destructive or socially repres-
sive. Were consumers to have the time and information to know
how each product is produced, they might adjust their buying
practices for social ends. Yet, consumers lack the time and infor-
mation to make such an analysis, and they thus depend on gov-
ernment intervention.43
Critics contend that their approach would not blow a hole
in the WTO system, because countries would not be able to re-
strict imports simply based on some difference in some produc-
tion method in a country at a wholly different level of develop-
ment.44 Critics would shift the test, they argue, from the current
arbitrary one, which asks whether products are physically "like,"
to a more nuanced one, which asks whether the import restric-
tion has a predominantly protectionist purpose.45 These critics
argue that the WTO has been trade-biased because it has fo-
43. Moreover, Howse and Regan claim that labeling is not sufficient because the
political majority in an importing country may not wish their country, as a whole, to
contribute to what they consider to be non-domestic environmental harm or social in-
justice. See Howse & Regan, supra note 12, at 272-74.
44. Some trade liberals and developing-country members argue otherwise. See,
e.g., John Jackson, Comments on Shrimp/Turtle and the Product/Process Distinction, 11 EUR.J.
INT'L L. 303 (2000). They maintain that countries have agreed to minimize tariffs and
not to discriminate against each other's products. Were WTO rules to permit trade
restrictions based on production processes, countries could void their obligations by
maintaining that they are not discriminating because the imported product may be
distinguished by how it is produced. Given the variety of labor, environmental, tax, and
other regulatory structures around the world, they argue that no two products would
ever be deemed to be alike, so that countries could be free to discriminate against each
other's products and the WTO system could collapse. Critics counter that this alleged
parade of horribles is a chimera, and that protectionism would still be checked by WTO
judicial review.
45. That is, the test would be either (i) whether the imports were not "like" (but
rather different) products under GATT Article III because of the processes under
which they were produced so that, in fact, no discrimination takes place, or (ii) whether
the import restriction constituted "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" under
GATT Article XX. See, e.g., Howse & Regan, supra note 12, at 260-61, 280-85; see also
Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers' Rights, 3 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 131 (1999); Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade
Policy, 38 VAJ. INT'L L. 689 (1998). Supporters of the current approach query whether
this sort of review would indeed be more "transparent," or would rather permit protec-
tionist interests to cloak their rationales under "labor" and "environmental" guises.
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cused on protecting trade of physically "like" products and not
on protecting social values reflected in production processes. In
light of the difficulty of international political negotiations over
social and environmental standards and their enforcement46 and
in light of the critics' distrust of the regulatory competition
model, they are more willing than defenders of the current sys-
tem to entrust the analysis of purpose, appropriateness, and pro-
portionality of national trade measures to international judicial
processes.
Critics similarly assert that the WTO's treatment of prison
labor under GATT Article XX(e) and of intellectual property
under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights47 ("TRIPS Agreement") already contradict the
alleged product-process distinction. If countries can ban prod-
ucts produced with prison labor, they argue, then there is no
reason that countries may not also ban products produced with
other forms of forced labor, including forced child labor,48 or
products produced in violation of other "core labor rights" as
such were recently defined by the International Labor Organiza-
tion ("ILO").4' Moreover, the TRIPS Agreement now mandates
46. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, What's So Bad about Unilateral Action to Protect the Envi-
ronment?, 11 EUR.J. INT'L L. 339 (2000) (noting that choice might be "between unilater-
alism or inaction," not "multilateralism"). Many critics envy the WTO's well-function-
ing dispute settlement system. The WTO's judicial process has no functioning ana-
logue in institutions overseeing their preferred policy domains, such as the ILO or the
international councils overseeing international environmental agreements. See, e.g.,
Christopher McCrudden & Anne Davies, A Perspective on Trade and Labor Rights, 3J INT'L
ECON. L. 43, 57 (2000). Were mandatory trade restrictions possible through these insti-
tutions, and were WTO rules not to constrain their application, some might be less
critical of the WTO. But since they are not currently applied, these critics see an imbal-
ance not only in how GATT and W[O panels have applied GATT rules, but also be-
tween the existing trade regime and its labor and environmental counterparts. See also
Howard Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the Global Environment, 83
GEO. L.J. 2131, 2150 (1995) (maintaining that a "carrots only" solution is an endorse-
ment of "victim pays" principle, because it would allow countries that harm the global
environment to extract concessions from others).
47. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
48. Some commentators, in recognition of the different development context in
developing countries, use the term "exploitative" child labor. See, e.g., Robert Howse,
supra note 45. The trick, of course, is defining what is exploitative and what is not in a
given developmental context, especially if sanctions could be applied unilaterally.
49. Elliott, supra note 27, at 193-94. See also Virginia Leary, Workers'Rights and Inter-
national Trade: The Social Clause (GAT7, ILO, NAFA, U.S. Laws), in Bhagwati & Hudec,
FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION, supra note 27, at 202-03 (proposing social clause by
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harmonized recognition and enforcement of patent, copyright
and other intellectual property rights. Under the WTO's Dis-
pute Settlement Understanding, countries may impose import
restrictions on products and services entirely unrelated to the
violated property right in question. If the WTO system can pro-
tect Madonna's, Puff Daddy's, and Eli Lilly's royalties, critics
pointedly remark, then there is no reason why it should not en-
force "core" labor standards and environmental norms.5 °
E. Developing Countries' Realist Concerns
National representatives before the WTO may adopt trade
liberal or social policy rhetoric when advancing arguments in
WTO negotiations. This does not mean that they are trade liber-
als or social activists. Rather, as shown by this author's detailed
study on state positions within the WTO on trade-environment
matters, state representatives primarily react to domestic constit-
uent pressures." Although developing-country non-governmen-
tal organizations ("NGOs") may be harsh critics of their govern-
ments at home, they have largely supported them internationally
in opposing developed country NGO demands for WTO accom-
modation of U.S. trade restrictions.52
International Federation of Free Trade Unions, World Confederation of Labour and
European Trade Union Confederations).
50. Some defenders of the WTO, however, argue that the TRIPS Agreement is a
mistake that should be corrected. Under their view, the TRIPS Agreement in no way
implements comparative advantage theory. For a study of the impact of the TRIPS
Agreement on India, see, e.g., Jayashree Watal, Pharmaceutical Patents, Prices and Welfare
Losses: Policy Options for India Under the WJO TRIPS Agreement, 23 WORLD ECON. 733, 752
(2000) (noting that "prices are likely to increase and welfare likely to decrease" in In-
dia); see also Keith Maskus, Intellectual Property Issues for the New Round, in THE WTO
ArER SEATrLE 137, 142 (2000) (noting estimate of "static risk transfers ... of some $5.8
billion per year" to the United States and "a net outward transfer of around $1.2 billion
per year" for Brazil); Alan Deardorff, Should Patent Protection Be Extended to All Developing
Countries? 13 WORLD ECON. 497, 507 (1990) (noting that "patent protection is almost
certain to redistribute welfare away from developing countries").
51. Shaffer, WTO Under Challenge, supra note 3, at 68-74, 81-83.
52. Id. For example, with respect to the Shrimp-Turtle Case, a dispute between In-
dia and the United States, the Center for Science and Environment ("CSE"), an Indian
environmental NGO, criticizes the Indian government for not insisting "that all trawlers
catching shrimp must use a turtle excluder device." The CSE maintains, "trust the gov-
ernment of India and its arms like the ministry of environment and forests to sit idle
while the turtle massacre goes on . . .The government of India is probably the most
hypocritical government of the Earth." Yet, in the same publication, the CSE confirms
that it "has consistently opposed the use of trade sanctions to conserve the global envi-
ronment because of the simple reason that only economically powerful nations can
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Even though the primary aim of the WTO is to facilitate the
negotiation of liberalized trade policies, state representatives typ-
ically take mercantilist positions within it. As mercantilists, they
strive to expand national exports, limit imports from other coun-
tries, and in this way, satisfy both their exporting and non-ex-
porting producer interests." Given mercantilist intergovern-
mental bargaining in the WTO, developing countries are con-
cerned that, in practice, the United States and the EU would
impose trade restrictions on labor and environmental grounds
to satisfy domestic producer interests. In both the controversial
Tuna-Dolphin Case and Shrimp-Turtle Case, although environmen-
talists may have had idealist ends, domestic producer interests
used environmental concerns to mask self-serving motives. In-
deed, in the Shrimp-Turtle Case, it was the conservative Gulf Coast
representatives in the U.S. Congress who were the sole sponsors
of the relevant legislation. They sponsored it only after the State
of Louisiana and its shrimping industry failed to block applica-
tion of a similar domestic regulation before U.S. federal courts.5 4
Developing-country representatives may rhetorically employ
a trade liberal rationale for not adopting a WTO social clause.
Yet, their primary concern is how such a clause would operate in
practice.55 Developing country representatives fear that the
clause would be constructed and used by developed countries to
restrict developing-country imports, and not vice versa, thus
worsening existing biases against them.56 They fear that the inte-
impose effective trade sanctions against less economically powerful nations." Anil
Agarwal, Turtles, Shrimp and a Ban, DowN Tio EARTH, June 15, 1998, at 4. See also Trade
Control is Not a Fair Instrument, DOWN TO EARTH, Aug. 15, 1992, at 4 (referring to how
"trade and human rights are being used today as sticks to beat the South").
53. Shaffer, WI'O Under Challenge, supra note 3, at 30-35, 52.
54. A U.S. environmental group, however, allied with the Gulf Coast shrimping
industry to sue the U.S. government before a U.S. court to enjoin it to implement the
import ban on South and Southeast Asian shrimp. See Gregory Shaffer, Trade and Envi-
ronment: Options for Resolving the WITO Shrimp-Turtle Case, 15 INT'L TRADE REP. 294, 295
(1998).
55. See, e.g., Jose M. Salzar-Xirinachs, The Trade-Labor Nexus: Developing Countries'
Perspectives, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 377-85 (2000) (providing perspective of developing
country).
56. See, e.g., Bhagwati, Trade Liberalisation, supra note 27, at 262-63 (noting that, in
light of power politics of international trade negotiations, social clause would likely be
constructed so that there would not be challenges to U.S. regulations and business prac-
tices concerning union organization and treatment of migrant workers). Rather, the
clause would likely cover child labor, which is a problem only in developing countries
on account of their level of development. Id. For a critique of U.S. labor practices, see
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gration of labor and environmental mandates into the WTO
could be used predominantly by the big powers to appease do-
mestic constituencies by blocking developing-country imports,
without any compensation to developing countries. Developing-
country NGOs often have very different priorities than their de-
veloped country counterparts. Yet even where developing-coun-
try NGOs have identical ideals, they experience in a more direct
manner how power politics in international economic relations
affect their application. While it is appropriate for developing
countries to enact social standards, it is not apparent to them
why this should be imposed and enforced by an international
trade regime or through unilateral action by the United States.
Many of them assert that such measures are coercive and un-
democratic because they interfere with developing-country poli-
cymaking choices to advance developing-country-determined
priorities.57 It is the law-in-action of international economic rela-
tions that they distrust.
II. AN ALTERNATIVE FOCUS: DOMESTIC POLITICS
IN THE UNITED STATES OVER THE
TRADE-ENVIRONMENT NEXUS
The pyrotechnics of anti-WTO protests to the contrary, the
WTO can do little about the underlying trade-environment
nexus until there is a change in domestic politics within the
world's great economic powers. If the United States wishes to
Human Rights Watch, Unfair Advantage: Workers'Freedom of Association in the United States
under International Human Rights Standards (2000), available at www.hrw.org/reports/
2000/uslabor/htm [hereinafter Human Rights Watch]. Cf Elliott, supra note 27. See
generally Gregory Shaffer, Public-Private Partnerships, Address before the Law and Soci-
ety Annual Meeting in Miami (June 2000) (on file with author) (discussing existing
biases within the WTO dispute settlement system).
57. See, e.g., VANDANA SHIVA, POLICING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: WHY, How AND FOR
WHOM? 105, 194 (Sadruddin Aga Khan ed., 1998). Vandana Shiva, Director of the Re-
search Foundation for Science, Technology and Natural Resource Policy, India, stated
the following:
[Tihe principle that was the basis of the of the Rio treaty... was a
principle of human rights, democracy, sovereignty and development. It was
the right to development, which also implies the full realization of the right of
peoples to self-determination, which in turn includes the exercise of their ina-
lienable rights to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources.
That right to development, to me, is the key test in every dispute decision by
the WTO.
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seriously address critical international environmental problems
such as global warming, the United States needs to do much
more than impose trade restrictions. The United States can im-
plement policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and spur
the development and use of new technologies at home that can
be exported abroad. If the United States is serious about envi-
ronmental problems in developing countries, it can provide fi-
nancial and technical assistance to assess and implement appro-
priate sustainable development policies, including through mar-
ket-based mechanisms.58 In each case, however, the United
States does little because of U.S. domestic politics. Yet, U.S.
protestors target their disdain on the WTO and not so much on
their own home government.
Environmental problems require positive policy responses,
but the trade-environment debate in the United States has al-
most solely revolved around the WTO legality of negative trade
restrictions against those least well off. Were the United States
serious about assisting with environmental protection efforts
abroad, it would not simply ban foreign imports, but would help
fund assessments of problems and implementation of improve-
ments abroad. There are international institutions mandated to
do this, and in particular the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme, the United Nations Environmental Programme, and
the Global Environment Facility. Yet, the United States has not
only failed to pay US$1,700,000,000 in U.N. dues,59 it has suc-
cessfully pressured the United Nations to reduce the amount of
the United States' allotment, even though it is based on a
smaller contribution in terms of U.S. per capita wealth than for
any other developed country.6 ° Moreover, the United States,
which is by far the wealthiest country in the world, currently
gives only 0.015% of its gross domestic product in foreign aid,
58. See, e.g., Jonathan Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in
Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677 (1999) (discussing market-based mechanisms).
59. Tim Weiner, Solitary Republican Senator Blocks Peacekeeping Funds, N.Y. TIMES,
May, 20, 2000, at Al.
60. U.N. Approves Deal Cutting U.S. Dues, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2000, at A10; see also
Christopher Wren, U.S. Told It Must Pay $550 Million or Risk Losing U.N. Vote, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 6, 1999, at A14 (noting that Richard Holbrooke, U.S. representative to the U.N.,
was lobbying to have U.S. contribution share reduced from 25% to 22%); THE STATES-
MAN'S YEARBOOK: THE POLITICS, CULTURE AND ECONOMIES OF THE WORLD 1687 (2001)
(stating that "[i] n terms of a percentage of GDP, the USA was the least generous major
industrialized country" in granting international aid).
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much of it targeted to Israel and Egypt for political and security
reasons.6' During the 1990s, the amount of U.S. foreign aid de-
clined an average of 8% per year.6
2
There are numerous examples of the U.S. domestic political
preference for trade bans over financial outlays. The Seattle
protestors lambasted the WTO for failing to support the United
States' ban on imports of South and Southeast Asian shrimp be-
cause of these countries' failure to require their shrimp trawlers
to use sea turtle protection devices as required by U.S. domestic
regulation. However, there have been no mass protests against
the United States' refusal to take domestic measures to reduce
its contribution to global warming, even though the United
States is responsible for over one third of all greenhouse emis-
sions.6 3 Nor have there been mass protests against the United
States' failure to provide financial assistance for environmental
improvements in developing countries, a need documented in
Agenda 21 signed at the 1992 "Earth Summit" in Rio de
Janeiro.64 Under pressure from oil-producing interests, the U.S.
Congress has refused to enact a tax on carbon emissions that
would create incentives to reduce them. In response to lobbying
from U.S. automobile manufacturers, the U.S. Congress has re-
laxed fuel efficiency requirements for mini-vans and sports utility
vehicles to 20.7 miles-per-gallon ("mpg") (as opposed to 27.5
mpg for all other automobiles).65 Under pressure from U.S.
pharmaceutical and petroleum interests, the United States has
61. Tim Weiner, House Votes to Cut $2 Billion From Clinton Foreign Aid Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 4, 1999, at A3 (noting that U.S. House passed US$12,600,000,000 interna-
tional aid bill for 2000 with US$4,880,000,000 billion earmarked for Israel and Egypt).
62. Joseph Kahn, Ideas & Trends: Fewer Strings Attached; The World's Bankers Try Giv-
ing Money, Not Lessons, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2000, at 4.
63. The U.S. accounted for 36% of total greenhouse gas emissions in 1990. More-
over, of all industrialized countries, between 1990 and 1998, the amount of U.S. emis-
sions increased the most rapidly, with 21.8% increase in emissions. In 1998, the U.S.
emitted 5,954 million metric tons (in carbon dioxide equivalents) of the Kyoto Proto-
col's six targeted heat-trapping greenhouse gases. Japan was in second, far behind at
1,225,600 metric tons. See, e.g., Andrew C. Revkin, 2 Weeks Starting Today to Argue Fine
and Crucial Details of Cutting Greenhouse Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2000, at 6.
64. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on Biological Diver-
sity, Agenda 21, June 5, 1992, U.N. Doc. UNEP/Bio.Div./N7-Inc.S/4 (June 5, 1992)
[hereinafter CBD].
65. Keith Bradsher, With Sport Utility Vehicles More Popular, Overall Automobile Fuel
Economy Continues to Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1999, at A22 (noting that average fuel
economy has been falling ever since 1987 and 1988 model years, with decline having
"accelerated").
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refused to ratify the U.N. Convention on Bio-diversity66 or the
Kyoto Protocol67 on global warming. 68 Yet, there have been no
significant protests in the United States against these policy deci-
sions supported by U.S. multinational corporate interests, cer-
tainly nothing comparable to the scale in Seattle.
The primary explanation is that it is much easier to com-
plain about the practices of other countries and use economic
power to impose costs on the people of those countries, than to
look critically at what one does at home. It is much easier to
close markets to people abroad-and poor ones at that-than to
protest against U.S. middle class preferences for cheap oil, trea-
sured gas guzzling minivans and sports utility vehicles. If U.S.
environmental NGOs wish to receive large contributions from
the U.S. public, it is easier for them to challenge poor countries'
production processes than central aspects of U.S. consumer cul-
ture with its negative environmental impacts. To be fair to U.S.
environmental groups, many have been on the forefront of de-
manding greater U.S. contributions toward sustainable develop-
ment projects and a more aggressive domestic approach to con-
front global warming. However, they are less successful on these
fronts because of U.S. political constraints. 69
The WTO Shrimp-Turtle Case again provides a prime exam-
ple of the domestic political context behind U.S. trade-environ-
ment policy choices. The U.S. legislation was easy to pass be-
cause it appeased the U.S. shrimp industry by forcing develop-
66. See CBD, supra note 64.
67. Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
opened for signature Mar. 16, 1998, available at http://www.unfccc.de/resource/
convkp.html [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
68. Revkin, supra note 63; James Brooke, U.S. Has a Starring Role at Rio Summit as
Villain, N.Y. TIMEs, June 2, 1992, at Al0; Barbara Crossette, The World; Tying Down Gul-
liver with Those Pesky Treaties, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1999, at 4 (noting that the United States
has also refused to ratify treaties prohibiting use of child soldiers, banning land mines,
creating permanent international criminal court, and prohibiting nuclear weapons
tests).
69. Although U.S. environmental NGOs may pursue altruistic environmental
goals, as any political actor, they are self-interested in their own continuity and political
relevance. I do not mean to suggest that U.S. environmental NGOs act in bad faith.
They do what they can within a given political context to attempt to protect the oceans,
the atmosphere, and endangered species and their habitat. The issue addressed here is
not whether U.S. environmental NGOs are right or wrong in challenging developing-
country production processes. Rather, I am addressing the domestic politics of which
method of confronting this issue is more likely to win U.S. domestic political support-
positive financial assistance and market-based programs, or trade restictions.
2000] WTO BLUE-GREEN BLUES 629
ing-country shrimp trawlers to either use the same standards
required in the United States or face an import ban. Legislation
of this sort is more easily passed than financing serious environ-
mental studies of the local sea turtle problems in developing
countries and the most effective ways to address them. Through
conditioning access to the U.S. market on the requirement of a
developing country's adoption of a U.S. regulatory framework,
the United States was attempting to force developing countries
to assume the costs of these U.S. Congressional priorities.7 ° In
the end, neither the United States, nor U.S. NGOs, have offered
any serious financial assistance to allay these costs.71 Although
the United States and U.S. NGOs claim that the costs are mini-
mal, they ignore the fact that local regulatory enforcement costs
are significant. Without local enforcement, the regulations be-
come merely symbolic. 72 Yet, it is the symbolism of trade restric-
tions that assumes more importance than real financial outlays
and tax incentives targeted toward environmental protection.
The United States chooses trade restrictions over financial
70. While it is true that some of these costs could be passed onto U.S. consumers
in the form of higher prices, this is not the case with government programs abroad
designed to introduce the requirements to their shrimpers, instruct them how to use
the new technology efficaciously, monitor compliance, and enforce the requirements.
Moreover, although it may be important for developing countries to require the use of
turtle excluder devices by shrimp trawlers, no one in the U.S. Congress ever asked
whether it was the most appropriate or the most effective way to proceed in a develop-
ing-country context. No one in the U.S. Congress looked at a study of local Asian con-
ditions or heard any testimony as to what was the nature of the Asian sea turtle prob-
lem. No one assessed whether there might be other first order problems, such as the
stealing and sale of sea turtle eggs, such that the U.S. legislation might be mis-targeted.
Moreover, developing-country parliaments and constituents were never consulted to
see if this was in fact their social priority. Yet, it is they who will have to expend re-
sources on this U.S.-determined social priority, with less funds available for competing
social programs. I am not arguing that this is not an important social priority. I, for
one, believe that it is. The issues, however, revolve around the processes and means
chosen to address the environmental problem.
71. The World Wildlife Fund, however, does support some local NGO efforts to
protect sea turtle nesting habitats and related programs. See Telephone Interview with
Jerry Tupascz, an employee/consultant with Wildlife Fund Thailand, a Thai NGO (Jan.
18, 2000) (on file with author).
72. For example, to avoid U.S. trade restrictions on shrimp imports, the foreign
country must enact the shrimping regulations desired by the United States. Approxi-
mately one week per year, the United States sends an observer, who is accompanied by
a national fisheries official as translator, to the foreign country. During this visit, it is
relatively easy for shrimp trawlers to use turtle excluder devices ("TEDs") that week in
order to demonstrate compliance with the U.S. program. The program can become a
charade.
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outlays, even though they impose costs on U.S. residents and are
not necessarily cheaper for the United States in the aggregate. A
ban on Asian shrimp imports results in higher priced shrimp in
the U.S. market and less consumer pocket money for other
goods. Although the costs are marginal per American con-
sumer, they add up. This defacto shrimp tax, however, is far eas-
ier to pass because it is more beneficial to the U.S. shrimp indus-
try, on the one hand, and less transparent to the U.S. general
public, on the other.
A de facto shrimp tax is less transparent than funding for
environmental protection in two important ways. First, the de
facto shrimp tax does not appear on receipts when U.S. consum-
ers buy shrimp, so that they remain unaware of the tax's exis-
tence. Second, it is easier to track how targeted funds for a con-
servation program are being used and whether the program is
cost-effective. Whereas the de facto shrimp tax's aggregate
amount is impossible to calculate, a line item budget allocation
for Asian sea turtle conservation is easily reported in the media.
Although an import ban and subsidization of environmental im-
provement projects may have similar aims, and although both
impose costs on U.S. consumers, the ban is typically chosen in-
stead of positive financial assistance because of the lack of trans-
parency of its costs to the U.S. public.
In addition, and probably most importantly, import bans,
directly benefit U.S. producers. Funds for environmental pro-
tection efforts abroad do not. U.S. producers, have high per
capita stakes in the outcome of Congressional policy choices.
They are thus more likely than other U.S. constituents to lobby
Congress and to present it with informed views on alternative
policy options. The result is U.S. legislation that triggers contro-
versial disputes brought before the WTO, ensuing challenges to
WTO legitimacy, and largely ineffective environmental protec-
tion, because developing-country governments and their constit-
uencies are treated primarily as antagonists.
It is this domestic politics-international trade-environment
linkage that is the fundamental challenge to the WTO and other
international institutions. The United States does not provide
significant financial support to international environmental in-
stitutions to promote positive sustainable development mea-
sures. The United States does not take measures to reduce its
own emissions, which lead to the world's gravest environmental
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challenge-global warming. For domestic political reasons, U.S.
activists are most successful in garnering support when they fo-
cus on trade restrictions to compel change in developing-coun-
try regulatory policies, as opposed to the need for greater finan-
cial assistance that more transparently taps the pocketbooks of
U.S. taxpayers. Ironically, it is this fundamental disconnection be-
tween international environmental needs and U.S. domestic
politics that is the central trade-environment linkage. This dis-
connection both confronts the world with its severest environ-
mental problems, and the WTO with controversies that it is ill-
equipped to address.
Developing countries recognize U.S. hypocrisy. But it
looms low in legal analysis of the international "trade-environ-
ment linkage" and the "future of the WTO."
III. THE DOMESTIC POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES OVER
THE TRADE-LABOR NEXUS
A. The U.S. Political/Economic Context
Although trade liberals correctly point out that free trade
policies increase U.S. national wealth, as well as global wealth,
this increase is an aggregate one. There is no guarantee as to
how it will be distributed. While skilled workers in the United
States, especially in high technology industries, are well-posi-
tioned to take advantage of trade liberalization, U.S. lower-
skilled workers are the most at risk within the developed world.
While those with better education and more skills have become
vastly wealthier under liberalized trade policies in a more knowl-
edge-based, technology-intensive economy, those with lower
skills and less education have been left largely behind. Whatever
the cause may be (whether technology, trade, business culture,
or deunionization), the United States has by far the greatest in-
come inequality among developed countries. 7  From 1979
through 1998, the average income of the top 5% of U.S. families
73. See generally, PAUL R. KRUGMAN, THE AGE OF DIMINISHED EXPECTATIONS: U.S.
ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1990s 21-28 (3rd ed. 1997); SHELDON DANZIGER & PETER
GOTTSCHALK, AMERICA UNEQUAL (1995); FRANK LEVY, THE NEW DOLLARS AND DREAMS:
AMERICAN INCOMES AND ECONOMIC CHANGE (1998). Cf Edward Learner, Foreigners and
Robots: Assistants of Some, Competitors of Others, in SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. TRADE POL-
ICY 19-64 (Alan Deardorff & Robert Stern eds., 2000) (offering alternative explana-
tions); Lawrence Mishel & T.N. Srinivasan, International Trade and Labour Standards from
an Economic Perspective, in SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. TRADE POLICY, supra at 19-64.
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grew by about 25%, while the average income of the bottom
20% fell about 4% in real terms.7 4 The top 1% of households
now possesses more wealth than the bottom 95%, more than
double the figure in 1977. 75 A recent study shows that the aver-
age CEO salary of the 500 leading companies in the United
States is now 475 times that of the average worker. This com-
pared to a ten-to-twenty-four-fold difference for the largest com-
panies in all other advanced industrialized countries. 76 Liberal-
ized trade policies, when not coupled with domestic redistribu-
tive policies, can threaten to exacerbate this growing income
gap.77
The United States combines gaping income inequality with
far less social protection than most developed countries. This is
particularly the case with health care. While the United States,
in aggregate, has the highest per capita wealth in the world, the
74. These are my calculations based on the tables in State of Working America. See
LAWRENCE MISHEL, ET AL., STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 1999-2000, at 51 (2000) [herein-
after STATE OF WORKING AMERICA]. Cf Daniel S. Levine, Taking Stock of How Unfair the
Economy Is, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Jan. 9, 2000, atJ5 (citingJared Bernstein, econo-
mist with Economic Policy Institute, for proposition that, from 1979 through 1998, aver-
age income of top 5% of U.S. families grew by about 39%, while average income of the
bottom 20% fell about 5% in real terms); see also OECD, ECONOMIC SURVEYS: UNITED
STATES 92-93 (2000) [hereinafter OECD 2000 U.S. Survey] (noting, however, that while
inequality remained high in United States, growth in inequality stabilized from 1993-
1998).
75. See CHUCK COLLINS ET AL., SHIFING FORTUNES: THE PERILS OF THE GROWING
AMERICAN WEALTH GAP 5 (1999); STATE OF WORKING AMERICA, supra note 74, at 262; see
also Michael Weinstein, 5 Problems Tarnishing a Robust Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1999,
at 10 (citing study of Edward N. Wolff of New York University contending that "the
wealthiest 1 percent of U.S. households controls nearly 40 percent of the total wealth,"
while "the bottom 40 percent of households control a meager two-tenths of a percent of
total wealth").
76. Executive Pay, ECONOMIST, Sept. 30, 2000, at 110 (chart based on survey of Stan-
dard & Poor's 500 leading companies and separate study by international consultant
Towers Perrin). The only other country listed as having more than a twenty-fold differ-
ence was the United Kingdom, with a twenty-four-fold difference. Id. Cf STATE OF
WORKING AMERICA, supra note 74, at 16 (noting average CEO earns "107 times more
than the typical worker" in United States, "about 2.5 times more than their foreign
counterparts").
77. See generally WILLIAM R. CLINE, TRADE AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION 272 (1997)
(estimating that over the next two decades trade would raise U.S. skilled/unskilled
wage ratio by about 6%); Paul Krugman & Robert Lawrence, Trade, Jobs and Wages, in
PoP INTERNATIONALISM (1998) (recognizing impact of trade, but maintaining that trade
is only relatively minor cause for growing wage inequality compared to domestic fac-
tors). Cf Bhagwati & Dehejia, supra note 33, at 71 (asserting that "the empirical evi-
dence to date fails to put the burden of the explanation for the observed decline in real
wages of the unskilled on freer trade").
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World Health Organization rates the United States twenty-fourth
in terms of general population health, thirty-seventh in terms of
overall health system performance, and fifty-fourth in terms of
distribution of the financial burden of health care.78 The
United States similarly has one of the highest poverty rates
among developed countries, particularly with regard to chil-
dren.79
The United States, moreover, has among the least protec-
tive labor and employment laws of any developed country.8"
U.S. labor laws provide employers with numerous means to
block union organizing, which is a major factor for the decline
of unions in the United States.81 Early in his first term, U.S.
President Clinton appointed a panel of experts to review the
state of U.S. labor regulations. This Commission on the Future
of Worker-Management Relations, chaired by former U.S. Secre-
tary of LaborJohn Dunlop, recommended significant changes to
provide for a more favorable environment for union organiz-
78. World Health Organization, The World Health Report 2000, available at
www.who.int/whr/2000/en/report.htm; see also The Health of Nations, ECONOMIST, June
24, 2000, at 93; OECD 2000 U.S. Survey, supra note 74, at 98 (reporting that "the share of
the poor [in the United States] who had no health insurance increased slightly to one-
third in 1998").
79. Different studies use different measures of poverty rates. They typically mea-
sure poverty rates as a percentage of median wealth, as opposed to a defined standard
of living in terms of purchasing power, so that the U.S. poverty rate, in part, is a mea-
sure of higher median U.S. wealth. Nonetheless, the United States retains its unenvi-
able top position among developed countries in terms of the percentage of its popula-
tion living below the poverty line according to such measures. See, e.g., GEOFFREY GAR-
RETT, PARTISAN POLITICS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 145 (1998) (noting U.S. rate of 18.4%
in late 1980s compared to average OECD rate of 8.4%); see also OECD 2000 U.S. Survey,
supra note 74, at 94 (reporting official U.S. poverty rate of 12.7% in 1998, down from
15% in 1993, yet noting that U.S. rates are relatively high once taxes and transfers are
accounted for); STATE OF WORKING AMERICA, supra note 81, at 9 (noting in Executive
Summary that "the percentage of U.S. children who are poor is twice as high as in other
advanced countries").
80. See, e.g., John Myles, When Markets Fail: Social Welfare in Canada and the United
States, in WELFARE STATES IN TRANSITION: NATIONAL ADAPTATIONS IN GLOBAL ECONOMIES
116-17 (Gosta Esping-Andersen ed., 1996) (noting that supporters of U.S approach, on
the other hand, maintain that "flexible" U.S. labor markets have led to job creation and
economic growth); GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF POSTINDUSTRIAL
ECONOMIES (1999) [hereinafter SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS]; Human Rights Watch, supra
note 56.
81. See, e.g., Richard Hurd, Contesting the Dinosaur Image: The Labor Movement's
Search for a Future, 22 LAB. STUD. J. 5 (1998); Daniel Nelson, What Happened to Organized
Labor, 50 AM. HERITAGE 81 (1999); Richard Freeman & Morris Kleiner, Employer Behavior
in the Face of Union Organizing Drives, 43 INDUS. LAB. REL. REv. 351, 351 (1990); Terry
Carter, A Labor of Law, 86 A.B.A. J. 54, 60 (2000).
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82ing. Its recommendations, however, were ignored following
the Republican upheaval in the 1994 election (dubbed the
"Gingrich Revolution"). Because of lax U.S. sanctions, many em-
ployers can simply fire employees instrumental in union organiz-
ing efforts with little consequence.83
These trends in the United States, and the prospect that
trade liberalization policies may exacerbate them, deeply con-
cern labor's defenders. In the past, the link between U.S. do-
mestic policy and international trade policy mattered less be-
cause the United States was a national economy relatively
shielded from international developments. In 1970, U.S. im-
ports and exports accounted for only 11% of U.S. gross domestic
product, rising to 14% by 1980 and increasing to 29% by 1999.84
Today, U.S. workers are more subject to international competi-
tion than ever before. Open trade policy makes more winners in
the U.S. economy. It makes more losers as well.
B. The Embedded Liberal Approach8"
The relative globalization of the U.S. economy, however,
does not signify that the United States has no choice but to cur-
tail existing social policies. Northern European economies have
long been more sensitive to trade. Even back in the 1970s, ex-
ports and imports in the Netherlands constituted over 80% of
Dutch production.86 Yet open trade policies were less controver-
sial in the Netherlands, because the Netherlands (like other Eu-
ropean states) cushioned those adversely affected through a
more generous social safety net-providing universal health
82. Voos, supra note 41, at 134-35. Voos was a member of the Dunlop Commission
and sets forth her proposals for U.S. labor law reform. Id.
83. See Carter, supra note 81, at 60; SHAUNA L. OLNEY, UNIONS IN A CHANGING
WORLD: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS IN SELECTED INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 37 (1996)
(noting that "[elven surviving legislation is rendered ineffective"). "Employers are
resorting to both legal and illegal union avoidance techniques with minimal risk since
in the case of the illegal tactics the penalties are inconsequential." Id.
84. U.S. Department of Commerce, GDP and U.S. International Trade in Goods and
Services, 1970-99, tbl. 1, in U.S. FOREIGN TRADE HIGHLIGHTS 1998 (1999), available at
http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/industry/otea/usfth/tabcon.html.
85. The term "embedded liberalism" comes from John Ruggie, International
Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, in
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 379-415 (1983) (referring to post-war compromise of
liberalized trade policy combined with domestic sovereignty to determine social
policies).
86. Garrett, supra note 79, at 57.
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care, child care assistance, minimum income guarantees, and a
more cooperative labor-management culture. s7 As Harvard
economist Dani Rodrik writes, "[s]ocieties that expose them-
selves to greater amounts of external risk demand (and receive)
a larger government role as shelter from the vicissitudes of
global markets. In the context of the advanced industrial econo-
mies specifically, this translates into more generous social pro-
grams. "88
Globalization does not significantly constrain advanced in-
dustrialized countries from ensuring more equitable social pro-
tections, but merely the manner in which they do so.8" As politi-
cal scientist Geoffrey Garrett writes in his study of the impact of
globalization on domestic economic autonomy, countries such
as the United States, with few social protections, have not, on
average, outperformed countries with significant social safety
nets and labor protections.9 0 Economies can continue to grow
and living standards rise under policies that provide for a more
just distribution of the fruits of globalized markets. Even if cer-
tain social policies were to result in reduced growth, an extra
US$1 of income to someone below the poverty line is of greater
importance than an extra US$1 of income to someone already
making US$1,000,000 annually.9 Where there are equity-effi-
ciency tradeoffs in domestic social policy, these can be addressed
through the domestic political process.9 2 As economist Paul
87. See generally, Rodrik, supra note 40, at 49-67; PETER J. KATZENSTEIN, SMALL
STATES IN WORLD MARKETS: INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN EUROPE (1994).
88. Rodrik, supra note 40, at 53.
89. For a social democratic perspective, see, e.g., MAURIZIO FERRERA ET AL., PORTU-
GUESE PRESIDENCY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL EUROPE: RECASTING
WORK AND WELFARE IN THE NEW ECONOMY 21 (2000) [hereinafter FERRERA] (noting that
.we counter the argument that welfare states are crumbling under external and domes-
tically generated pressures"); Maurizio Ferrera & Martin Rhodes, Building a Sustainable
Welfare State: Reconciling Social Justice and Growth in the Advanced Economies, in PROGRES-
SIVE GOVERANCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 145-67 (1999) [hereinafter Ferrera & Rhodes];
STATES AGAINST MARKETS: THE LIMITS OF GLOBALIZATION (Robert Boyer & Donald
Drache eds., 1996). For a neoliberal position, see, e.g., John 0. McGinnis & Mark L.
Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511 (2000) (stressing benefits
of jurisdictional competition over regulation at international level).
90. Garrett, supra note 79, at 18-20.
91. See, e.g., MAx CORDEN, TRADE POLICY AND ECONOMIC WELFARE 107-8 (1974)
(stating that "in terms of welfare weights, increases are given relatively low weights and
decreases very high weights").
92. The central issues for the United States and Europe become (i) how much of
an efficiency tradeoff do more equitable social policies entail, and (ii) how much do
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Krugman affirms:
We have the resources to take far better care of our poor and
unlucky than we do; if our policies have become increasingly
mean-spirited, that is a political choice, not something im-
posed on us by anonymous forces. We cannot evade responsi-
bility for our actions by claiming that global markets made us
do it. 9
Politically, however, the United States is far from introduc-
ing new social reforms, and in fact is moving in the opposite
direction. Take for example the recent conservative push for
large-scale tax cuts in the United States. There is nothing in
trade liberalization that mandates a repeal of the U.S. estate tax
or a US$2,000,000,000,000 tax cut that benefits primarily the
wealthiest 1% of U.S. citizens.94 The money targeted for tax cuts
could provide funding for universal health care, a conditional
negative income tax," increased funding of public schools and
job training, enhanced child care opportunities for working fam-
ilies, and other social infrastructure programs.96
open trade and investment policies constrain them from implementing the balance
that they desire. See Garrett, supra note 79, at 6 (focusing on advanced industrialized
countries). As Garrett concludes, "globalization and national autonomy are not mutu-
ally exclusive options. The benefits of globalization can be reaped without undermin-
ing the economic sovereignty of nations, and without reducing the ability of citizens to
choose how to distribute the benefits-and the costs-of the market." Id.
93. PAUL KRUGMAN, ACCIDENTAL THEORIST AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE DIs-
MAL SCIENCE 78 (1998).
94. Richard Stevenson, The 2000 Campaign; Sorting It Out: Tax Cuts and Spending,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2000, at 26 (noting statement of Citizens for TaxJustice that a repeal
of the U.S. federal estate tax would almost exclusively benefit people in top 1% income
bracket, and 42% of benefits of U.S. President George W. Bush's proposed tax cut
would also go to wealthiest 1%).
95. See, e.g., Ferrera & Rhodes, supra note 89, at 152 (asserting that a negative
income tax could be conditional on efforts to obtain employment).
96. The domestic side of these policies can be roughly categorized as "health pro-
tection," "minimum income protection," "human capital formation," and "employment
facilitation." The United States could implement greater social protection while retain-
ing its relatively flexible labor laws on employee dismissals. Supporters of the U.S. ap-
proach to more flexible labor laws argue that rigid dismissal policies raise employee
dismissal costs, with the result that "insider" employees have well-protected jobs, but
employers have little incentive to hire new employees from amongst the unemployed
("outsiders"). Social protection can nonetheless be combined with significant labor
flexibility to both ensure an effective labor market and policies protecting against wide-
spread social exclusion and poverty. See, for example, the examination of the concept
of "flexicurity," developed in the Netherlands, in Ferrera, supra note 89, at 48-49, 51-52
(the concept of flexicurity "reconcil[es] labour market flexibility with measures to
counter growing social exclusion and the emergence of a class of working poor").
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C. The Domestic Politics of Policy Tools to Assist Domestic Labor
Two primary forms of protection can be provided to the less
privileged in the United States: social protection in the form of
guaranteed medical care, union organizing rights, job retraining
and adjustment assistance, and trade protection. Because of U.S.
political constraints, mass protests can more easily rally over the
need for trade restrictions on labor grounds rather than the
need for greater financial assistance to the less privileged. Once
more, the costs of domestic social programs to taxpayers are
clear, while the costs of trade restrictions against developing-
country imports are not.
From a policy perspective, however, withdraw of U.S. mar-
ket access will be relatively ineffective in enhancing social protec-
tion compared to directly targeted social programs. While it is
true that trade restrictions assist certain U.S. industries or firms
and thus to some extent their workers, they do not provide
greater social protection to workers generally. Moreover, sys-
temic labor market forces determine, for the most part, how pro-
tectionist benefits are distributed among workers, management
and shareholders. Where corporations retain some discretion,
executive officers, subject to oversight by a board of directors,
make this determination. Given trends in income disparity in
the United States, reflected in management largesse toward its
own compensation plans, it is not clear that U.S. workers would
receive significant benefits from trade protection.97 Rather,
trade restrictions can become mere symbols that defuse and di-
vert challenges away from the United States' own domestic poli-
cies.98
Similarly, while union activists are justifiably concerned by
97. Corporations can distribute protectionist benefits in the form of increases in
management compensation, worker wages and benefits, shareholder dividends, or re-
tained earnings. To give just one example of management appropriation of the eco-
nomic rents from trade restrictions, after the United States negotiated voluntary export
restraints with Japanese automobile manufacturers in the early 1980s, the upper man-
agement of the Big Three automobile manufacturers paid themselves multi-million dol-
lar salaries and bonuses. See, e.g., Stewart Fleming, Sharing in New Profits, N.Y. TIMES,
May 6, 1984, at 4;John Holusha, Big Bonuses at the Big 3 Again, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1985,
at 31.
98. On the symbolism of politics and law and their uses, see, e.g. MURRAY J.
EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964); MURRAYJ. EDELMAN, POLITICS AS SYM-
BOLIC ACTION; MASS AROUSAL AND QUIESCENCE (1971).
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the decline in unionization rates in the United States,99 trade
restrictions will not modify lax U.S. labor laws or their lax en-
forcement. First, trade liberalization is not the central cause of
deunionization in the United States. Unionization rates remain
between 75% and 95% in Scandinavian countries, whose econo-
mies are much more trade-dependent.'0 0 Second, if the United
States desired to increase union representation, the primary
means of doing so would be through new domestic labor regula-
tion. The United States, for example, could pass legislation rec-
ommended by the Dunlop Commission that would grant a more
favorable environment for union organizing. But this is not on
the political radar screen.' 0 1 Rather, conservative and business
interests now strategically deploy international competition as an
argument to counter labor law reform proposals and to block
unionization efforts, again spurring union demands for cur-
tailing trade from developing countries. 2
There are consequences for the global trading system from
U.S. domestic political choices. Conservative U.S. domestic
politics beget conservative U.S. domestic policies that place U.S.
workers at a greater risk when they lose their jobs on account of
imports. 10 3 Some producer constituencies will always desire pro-
99. See Steven Greenhouse, Unions Hit Lowest Point in 6 Decades, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21,
2001, at 6 (noting that "down from 20 percent in 1983 and a peak of 35 percent in the
1950's . . . membership among private-sector workers fell to 9 percent"). See generally
Carter, supra note 81.
100. GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF POSTINDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES
20 (1999).
101. This is, in part, because of the current Republican control of the U.S. presi-
dency and Congress, but it also reflects the increasingly aggressive attitude toward un-
ions among U.S. management starting in the 1980s, as well as less active U.S. public
support for unions. See, e.g., Low Levels of Confidence in Labor, 9 HEADWAY 32, 32 (1997)
(noting existence of "low levels of confidence in organized labor as an institution, and
in labor union leaders' honesty and ethical standards" in United States).
102. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 81, at 60 (stating that "[t]he federal government
must create an environment conducive to business or companies and jobs can and will
go overseas").
103. The underlying link between domestic social policy and international trade
policy is captured in a grid consisting of four separate squares. The grid measures the
views of U.S. politicians on globalization on the one hand, and domestic social and
labor protection on the other. While some politicians on the left and the right of the
U.S. political spectrum have each opposed trade liberalization, the left has favored a
more generous social safety net and more protective labor regulation, which the right
has opposed. Other candidates on the left and on the right, however, have favored
trade liberalization, but differed on the extent of U.S. social and labor protection.
These policies, although usually debated separately, are interdependent. A similar ma-
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tection from import competition. Worker demands, however,
become more aggressive where the consequences from job dis-
missals are harsher and the opportunities to find comparable
jobs reduced. Since union-organized workers are more at risk
from liberalized trade policies than ever before, and since there
are political constraints on obtaining increased social protection
domestically, it is no surprise that they challenge the United
States' support of liberalized trade policy overseen by the WTO.
In the final analysis, there is no paradox between the fact that
the U.S. offers the least generous social and labor protections in
the developed world and is the most aggressive in demanding the
right to restrict imports on labor rights grounds.' °4
D. The Domestic Politics of Policy Tools to Assist Foreign Labor
Most labor rights proponents are genuinely concerned
about the protection of foreign (as well as domestic) labor rights
and ongoing abuses of those rights. There are a number of al-
ternative and complementary policy tools from which they can
choose. Economic sanctions constitute one means to combat vi-
olations of such rights. However, especially where those sanc-
tions are unilaterally determined, they can perversely affect their
purported beneficiaries-developing-country workers.
Among the "core" international labor rights that advocates
promote are the rights of association and collective bargaining.
A central goal behind these rights is to facilitate what European
labor advocates call "concertation" between labor, capital, and
government representatives to negotiate a more just social or-
der.0 5 However, regardless of what one thinks of this approach
trix is adopted by Thomas Friedman in Friedman, supra note 35, at 438 (charting Inte-
grationists and Separatists, on one axis, and Social-Safety Netters and Let-Them-Eat-
Cakers, on the other).
104. Although European Union federations have pushed for a WVTO social clause,
they have been much less aggressive than U.S. labor. They have found that U.S. pro-
posals can convey more of a trade protectionist than an internationalist human rights
concern. See David Trubek & Jody Knauss, The Transatlantic Labor Dialogue: Minimal
Action in a Weak Structure, in TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONoMY 250
(Mark A. Pollack & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2001) (noting view of European labor officials
"that the U.S. proposal for Seattle smelled protectionist, was in any event a 'nonstarter,'
and would needlessly alienate colleagues from the third world"). See also Brown, supra
note 43, at 257 (noting lack of support from many European representatives of U.S.
position on labor standards at 1996 WTO Ministerial meeting in Singapore).
105. See Ferrera et al., supra note 89, at 54-58 (noting preference for "negotiated
labour market regulation" and "investment in negotiated structures of governance").
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to policymaking, "concertation" will not take place through facil-
itation of U.S. trade restrictions on labor grounds that have been
unilaterally determined by U.S. officials. When officials in Wash-
ington D.C., subject to domestic political pressures, restrict de-
veloping-country imports on labor grounds, and an international
trade panel assesses the appropriateness and proportionality of
the U.S. action, no tripartite government-business-labor "con-
certation" takes place. As the human rights scholar Philip Alston
writes, "the form in which the [labor] standards are stated [in
U.S. trade laws] is so bald and inadequate as to have the effect of
providing a carte blanche to the relevant U.S. government agen-
cies, thereby enabling them to opt for whatever standards they
choose to set in a given situation."10 6
Developing countries and most developing-country unions
and NGOs justifiably fear that their interests will not be seriously
considered by U.S. decision-makers. They are not assuaged by
the retort that developing countries would retain the right to
challenge the proportionality of the U.S. trade restrictions, on a
case-by-case basis, before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.
WTO procedures are expensive, take almost two years to com-
plete, and their central remedy is the removal of the trade re-
strictions long after they have inflicted their harm."°7
An international institution exists which brings together
representatives of governments, employers and labor to negoti-
"Concertation" refers to institutions that facilitate reasoned deliberation among repre-
sentatives of government, business, and labor. Id.; see also SOCIAL PACTS IN EUROPE-
NEW DYNAMIC (Giusepee Fajertag & Philippe Pochet eds., 1997) (referring also to "cor-
poratism").
106. Philip Alston, Labor Rights Provisions in U.S. Trade Law: Aggressive Unilateral-
ism?, 15 HuM. RTs. Q. 1, 7-8 (1993).
107. Moreover, this remedy assumes that the United States would comply with an
adverse WTO ruling. Were the United States not to comply, WTO rules authorize the
developing county to retaliate by withdrawing an equivalent amount of trade conces-
sions from the United States. However, because of developing countries' relatively
smaller markets, and because of potential U.S. political leverage in other areas, a devel-
oping country's threat of withdrawing trade concessions is less likely to be effective.
If transnational enforcement is to take place, it arguably should occur through a
neutral forum determining that a violation has occurred, and not through unilateral
determination (as by the United States), subject to ex post review under GATT Article
XX. See Erika de Wet, Labor Standards in the Globalized Economy: The Inclusion of a Social
Clause in the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade/World Trade Organization, 17 HUM. RTS.
Q. 443, 455-60 (1995) (commenting on difference between ex post review under GATT
Article XX and third party review under GATT Article XXIIt as applied to core labor
rights).
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ate internationally recognized labor rights and mechanisms for
their oversight and enforcement-the ILO. The ILO provides
for periodic reporting, international review and complaint pro-
cedures over countries' compliance with these ILO commit-
ments." 8 The United States, however, is notorious for refusing
to ratify the vast majority of international labor agreements and
for refusing to take an active part in the ILO, in particular com-
pared to its active role within the WTO. In fact, the United
States has ratified only thirteen of the 182 international labor
conventions negotiated under the ILO's auspices.'09 Moreover,
the United States has failed to ratify the conventions that cover
two of the ILO's four "core" labor protection principles, those
providing for (i) nondiscrimination in employment and (ii) the
freedom of worker association and the "effective recognition of
the right to collective bargaining."' 0 Because of ILO reciprocity
rules, the U.S. government has no right to initiate ILO com-
plaints under any agreement to which it is not a party."' If the
United States genuinely desires greater international enforce-
ment of "core" labor rights, its demands would be more credible
were it to agree to work more closely with the existing interna-
tional labor regime.
Working with and through the ILO is a more coherent way
of addressing foreign labor issues than bringing them to an in-
ternational trade body in which countries truck and barter their
trading interests. However, because of its government-averse,
foreigner-wary domestic politics, the United States invests few re-
sources in the ILO. The United States refuses to grant ILO over-
sight over its labor policies (which have been subject to re-
buke), 2 while demanding greater autonomy from WTO rules
to restrict imports from developing countries because of their ]a-
108. The ILO system also contains mechanisms for sanctioning violations of labor
rights, though these mechanisms remain relatively limited. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note
27; Leary, supra note 49, at 177.
109. Elliott, supra note 27, at 194-95; see also Leary, supra note 49, at 177, 188 (as-
serting that United States has "shameful record that places [it] among the countries
that have ratified the fewest ILO conventions").
110. Id.
111. See generally Elliott, supra note 27, at 191, 195 (noting that United States has
ratified core agreements on freedom from forced labor and "effective abolition of child
labor").
112. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, supra note 56.
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bor policies." 3 Developing countries recognize this U.S. hypoc-
risy. But it again looms low in legal analysis of the "trade-labor
linkage."
International labor rights issues are more problematic than
international environmental issues for two primary reasons.
First, many environmental problems are clearly transnational
and global in their effects and thus require global and transna-
tional solutions. Second, many of the core labor rights are pro-
cedural in nature, such as the rights to association and collective
bargaining. The benefit of funds targeted toward substantive en-
vironmental protection policies are more immediately apparent
than the benefit of funds targeted toward the protection of pro-
cedural rights.'" 4
Nonetheless, proactive policies (whether or not coordinated
through the ILO) can be targeted toward foreign labor rights
protection. For example, instead of simply imposing sanctions
on products made with child labor (or countries that permit
this), developed countries could work more closely with interna-
tional and regional development institutions to finance pro-
grams that provide incentives for parents to place their children
in schools or in less severe conditions.115 Developed countries
and constituencies also can fund networks whereby developed
country NGOs and labor representatives share information with
developing-country counterparts." 6 Working through such net-
113. See Alston, supra note 106, at 32 (pointing out that United States simply pre-
fers to act "as the sole legislator, judge, jury, and enforcement authority").
114. Along the same lines, however, the criteria for determining what constitutes a
procedural rights violation that can trigger trade restrictions is also subject to difficult
interpretive issues, as witnessed by the vagaries of U.S. labor law jurisprudence itself.
115. In many developing-country contexts, children arguably may be better off in
apprenticeships than in formal schooling. See Brown, supra note 43, at 254-55, 263 (ex-
pressing skepticism toward many programs to improve situation of child labor, but
nonetheless supporting "country-specific incentive schemes"). Programs to address
child labor are increasingly being financed, including through the ILO, World Bank,
and UNICEF, although still at relatively modest levels. See Elliott, supra note 27 (noting,
for example, that Clinton administration proposed increasing U.S. "contribution to the
ILO's International Program for the Elimination of Child Labor" and "for a program of
technical assistance for countries improving enforcement of the core labor standards,
as well as . . . for bilateral assistance to help countries improve the administration of
labor laws and social safety net programs"); see also Leary, supra note 54, at 202-03 (ex-
plaining that International Federation of Free Trade Unions, the World Confederation
of Labour and European Trade Union Confederations have proposed creation of "new
international social fund").
116. This, too, is at a very preliminary, unstable stage. See, e.g., David Trubek et al.,
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works, activist groups can develop "codes of conduct," and inde-
pendent labeling and auditing procedures.' 17 Increased infor-
mation exchange and monitoring can empower developing-
country workers and be more effective than trade restrictions in
actually enforcing labor rights abroad. They are, in addition,
less likely to have a trade protectionist slant and unintended per-
verse social effects, such as driving children into deeper poverty
or the sex trade. Market-oriented initiatives targeted at multina-
tional commodity chains are not in themselves sufficient. But
they are important policy tools to complement the necessary bol-
stering of social infrastructures within developing countries.
There are two prongs to the "Washington consensus" that
are often treated as indivisible: trade and capital liberalization,
on the one hand, and reduced taxes, government regulation,
and social programs, on the other. Yet, as discussed above, these
policy choices are divisible. In fact, they may be in contradic-
tion. The U.S. demand for trade sanctions against developing-
country imports on environmental and social policy grounds is
in part a reflection of the United States' failure to support pro-
grams domestically and internationally that directly address envi-
ronmental and social concerns. If the United States truly wishes
to assist workers abroad, it must pro-actively work with interna-
tional and regional institutions to enhance the social infrastruc-
ture within developing countries. Again, however, because of
the U.S. political attitude toward taxes, government, foreign aid
and international development and labor institutions, and be-
cause of the less transparent costs of trade restrictions, it is much
Transnationalism in the Regulation of Labor Relations: International Regimes and Transna-
tional Advocacy Networks, 25 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 1187 (2000). In my view, these networks
are inherently unstable because of the varying interests of constituencies-such as labor
groups-in developed and developing countries. Nonetheless, the NAFTA environ-
mental and labor side agreements do facilitate information exchange through such
networks.
117. See, e.g., Charles Sabel et al., Ratcheting Labor Standards: Regulation for
Continuous Improvement in the Global Workplace, Paper Given at the Work and So-
cial Citizenship in a Global Economy Conference at the University of Wisconsin (Nov.
11, 2000) (on file with author) (setting forth decentralized "regulatory alternative that
aims to improve social performance of firms in global economy"); Debora Spar, The
Spotlight and the Bottom Line: How Multinationals Export Human Rights, FOREIGN AFF.,
Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 7. Many commentators criticize these labeling programs as well. See
Brown, supra note 43 (reasoning that depending on how they are designed, some label-
ing programs could have adverse affects on developing-country workers, although they
are not as blunt instruments as trade sanctions).
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easier to pass U.S. legislation restricting market access than to
fund social infrastructure and worker assistance projects. The
U.S. failure to more coherently address social policy-interna-
tional trade policy linkages can thereby pit developed and devel-
oping country workers against each other.
IV. COORDINATING THE ROLES OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
In a globalizing economy, countries can pursue policies to
ease workers' adjustment not only domestically, but also interna-
tionally. Some commentators on the left, for example, have
called for a "global new deal" through which the United States
would provide increased assistance to developing countries in
exchange for greater oversight and enforcement of labor
rights.118 These commentators recognize that trade restrictions
alone are not sufficient. Western governments, however, are not
close to considering a global new deal. Nonetheless, there is
scope for a more modest coordination of international institu-
tions to address developing-country adjustment to liberalized
trade initiatives. While the United States and European coun-
tries have the wealth and the choice to provide for medical cov-
erage, education, retraining, retirement pensions, child-care
support, and other forms of social protection, developing coun-
tries do not. International development institutions can, how-
ever, provide some of this assistance in coordination with trade
reforms.
This Part examines the domestic politics behind the WTO
dispute over the EU's banana regime, as well as alternative poli-
cies that could be pursued to address worker concerns in poor
banana growing regions. Although the banana dispute did not
directly concern labor standards, one of the asserted rationales
behind the EU's discriminatory banana regime was to assist ba-
nana producers in these lesser developed regions. The banana
case again exemplifies the domestic politics behind the EU's
choice of trade restrictions over positive measures to accomplish
its stated social goals.
The EU banana regime imposed tariff-rate quotas on the
importation of bananas from other than selected countries in
118. See, e.g., Jeff Faux, Time for a New Deal with Mexico, AM. PROSPECT, Oct. 23,
2000, at 11.
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Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific ("ACP countries") that
had former colonial ties with certain EU members. In addition,
the EU granted licenses for the importation of non-ACP bananas
in a manner that privileged certain European operators." 9 The
WTO Appellate Body held that the EU regime violated obliga-
tions under three WTO agreements.1 20 This decision was the ob-
ject of strong normative claims from both its critics and support-
ers. The decision's critics argued that, by subjecting African and
Caribbean countries to a competitive global banana market, the
WTO would uproot their economies and drive them to produce
cocaine and other illicit drugs.12' They complained that the pri-
mary impetus of the dispute was a U.S. corporation, Chiquita,
whose conservative Chairman of the Board is one of the largest
contributors to both the U.S. Republican and Democratic par-
ties.122 The decision's defenders countered that the critics tend
to ignore the discriminatory nature of the EU banana regime,
which profits well-placed British, French, and other EU banana
trading companies working with former British and French colo-
nies and harms workers in Latin American and Central Ameri-
can countries.123
Both sides, in fact, fail to acknowledge that there is a broad
policy spectrum between unbridled trade liberalization and
keeping it corralled. Trade liberalization policies could, for ex-
ample, be coupled with international trade adjustment assis-
tance. Immediate undoing of the EU banana regime could se-
verely harm workers in Caribbean and African countries, some-
thing ignored by many of the decision's defenders. Yet,
Caribbean countries can produce more than bananas and illicit
drugs, something ignored by many of the decision's critics.
119. See Rikke Thagesen & Alan Mathews, The EU's Common Banana Regime: An
Initial Evaluation, 35J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 615 (1997) (supplying an overview of
the EU banana regime).
120. See European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Ba-
nanas, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997) (finding that the
EU banana regime violated provisions of GATT, the Agreement on Import Licensing
Procedures, and GATS).
121. Larry Rohter, Trade Storm Imperils Caribbean Banana Crops, N.Y. TIMES, May 9,
1997, at A6.
122. David Sanger, Even a Big Donor Can Find Political Dividends Elusive, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 1997, at A10 (reporting that Carl Linder and his company, American Financial
Corporation, have given US$648,000 to Republicans and US$400,000 to Democrats
since 1993).
123. See, e.g., Fruitless But Not Harmless, ECONOMIST, Apr. 10, 1999, at 18.
2000]
646 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 24:608
Under existing WTO rules, trade adjustment relief can be pro-
vided for up to an eight-year period.1 24 Developing countries,
however, typically do not have the government revenues to ease
the adjustment of workers to other occupations. Moreover, in
the bananas case, the EU is implementing the trade restrictive
regime, but developing-country banana producers in Africa and
the Caribbean should be the object of assistance.125 WTO coor
dination with other international agencies could play an impor-
tant role. Agencies such as the World Bank, the United Nations
Development Programme, and regional development banks
could provide financial assistance, loans, and training to help in-
dustries, firms, and workers in these countries adjust to the dis-
mantling of the EU's discriminatory banana regime. While this
may not constitute a "global new deal," it shows how existing in-
ternational agencies can re-conceptualize their missions and co-
ordinate their work so that when discriminatory trade measures
that benefit certain developing countries are removed, real fi-
nancial assistance can be provided over an appropriate transi-
tion period.
Domestic politics in powerful states, however, bodes poorly
for such enhanced coordination. The EU could, for example,
independently finance trade adjustment in former European
colonies. The EU could do so in a manner that, after tax, EU
citizens would be better off, because they would no longer have
to pay a hidden defacto banana tax (in the form of higher priced
bananas). Yet, the EU has so far chosen to retain its banana re-
gime in lieu of providing positive adjustment assistance to ba-
nana regime beneficiaries. It has done so for similar reasons as
the United States when the United States does not fund sustaina-
ble development projects abroad. The defacto banana tax is sim-
ply less transparent and its cost-effectiveness less subject to moni-
toring and criticism than positive trade adjustment assistance. In
124. See Agreement on Safeguards, art. 7, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex
]A, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legale/final_e.htm [hereinafter Agree-
ment on Safeguards] (mandating that period of safeguard application shall not exceed
four years, unless extension is necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and there is
evidence that industry is adjusting, but total period of relief shall not exceed eight
years).
125. In other words, under existing WTO safeguard rules, the EU can only apply
safeguard relief where increasing imports "cause or threaten to cause serious injury" to
its own "domestic industry that produces like or directly competitive products [i.e. ba-
nanas]," not to a third country's bananas industry. See id. art. 2.
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addition, as in the U.S. environmental context, well-placed do-
mestic commercial interests profit from the restrictions. In con-
sequence, the EU banana regime remains, a legal case is scuttled
to the WTO, the WTO applies its anti-discrimination rules, and
critics challenge the WTO as trade-biased and illegitimate.
These are the domestic political ingredients in WTO legal con-
flicts that produce the WTO's current quagmire.
CONCLUSION: U.S. DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE WTO,
THE REAL TRADE-SOCIAL POLICY LINKAGE
This Article has taken a separate track from that of most
Western commentators on trade-social policy linkages by assess-
ing a second linkage-the domestic-international one. Simply
stated, trade restrictions alone will not achieve most of the goals
of anti-WTO protestors. To be effective, an international cam-
paign to protect the environment and improve the lot of workers
in poor countries requires positive programs by national govern-
ments and international agencies, whether or not these are im-
plemented independently or as a complement to trade restric-
tions. Required initiatives include multilateral efforts to address
global issues, such as global warming, and assistance to develop-
ing countries in devising effective environmental and labor poli-
cies at the national level.
The debate over trade sanctions is intense, and there are
persuasive arguments on both sides as to whether certain mini-
mum environmental and social standards should be negotiated
and enforced at the international level. While I support the
need for international cooperation, oversight and enforcement
capacity as a complement to open trade policy,'26 this Article
does not attempt to resolve that issue. Rather, this Article dem-
onstrates the unlikelihood that the debate over trade sanctions
in support of environmental and social goals will advance until
there is greater evidence of political will within developed coun-
tries, and particularly within the United States, to address their
own internal environmental and social problems and to expand
their international economic assistance. WTO critics from
northern states will not be successful in having developing coun-
tries agree to a modification (or interpretation) of WTO rules
that would facilitate the imposition of trade restrictions on
126. See supra note 7, 107 para.2 and accompanying text.
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agreed environmental and core labor rights grounds, unless the
United States, Europe, and other developed countries also agree
to provide significant financial assistance to developing coun-
tries for implementing appropriate environmental and social
policies.'27 Moreover, from both equity and efficiency perspec-
tives, developing countries and developing-country constituen-
cies should retain a significant role in shaping and adapting
these policies to their local conditions so that developing-coun-
try constituencies have a stake in them, and the policies are ap-
propriate for the local situation.
It is unfortunate that so much of the trade-environment,
trade-labor debate in the United States focuses on trade restric-
tions. The central explanation appears to be domestic politics
within powerful states. It is simply easier to lambaste the World
Trade Organization than to get the U.S. Congress' attention to
pass legislation that transparently imposes costs on domestic
constituents. Enactment of universal health care, a greenhouse
gas emissions tax, trade adjustment assistance, and funding for
sustainable development and social infrastructure projects
abroad all would impose direct costs on domestic constituents in
the form of taxes. When these initiatives are thwarted in the
United States, it is more difficult to garner public sympathy
through dramatic protests. Yet, livelihoods and environmental
welfare remain at risk. Activists more easily rally masses by pro-
claiming that the threat's cause lies in foreign (or "multina-
tional") producers and their protector, the WTO.' 28 They focus
their limited resources where they are most likely to succeed.
127. The members of the European Union, for example, are at a much more
equal level of development. But even in the EU, there have been significant financial
transfers to poorer EU members through the EU's cohesion and structural funds. See,
e.g., Andre Sapir, Trade Liberalization and the Harmonization of Social Policies: Lessons from
European Integrration, in Bhagwati & Hudec, FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION, supra note
27; Mark Pollack, Regional Actors in an Intergovernmental Play: The Making and Implementa-
tion of EC Structural Policy, in BUILDING A EUROPEAN POLrTY? (Carolyn Rhodes & Sonia
Mazey eds., 1995). However, given the relatively similar levels of development in the
EU, the tradeoff between financial assistance and demands for higher standards is not
nearly as challenging.
128. Conceivably, activists believe that by attacking the WTO, they threaten U.S.
multinational export interests, and that these interest, in order to preserve an open
trading system, will pressure the U.S. Congress to enact positive domestic and interna-
tional environmental and social policies. I have, however, seen little evidence of this.
As noted earlier, labor and environmental advocates work within the parameters of U.S.
domestic politics, which respond more favorably to demands for trade restrictions than
to demands for policies requiring more direct financial expenditure.
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The U.S. 2000 election of a Republican administration
bodes poorly for refocusing political pressure toward govern-
ment funding of domestic and international environmental and
social agendas. The likely result is that the WTO will continue to
be a target for attacks and a symbol of the negative aspects of
globalization and none of its benefits. The consequences for the
WTO could be stagnation, hesitancy, and calls for curtailing the
scope of its authority, from those at conservative think tanks, 1
29
to the demonstrators in Seattle demanding not a new round, but
a "turnaround.'
' 30
People saw the result of anarchism in the streets of Seattle.
Yet, Seattle's black-clad anarchists have white-collar allies in
those who attack any government policy to assist the less privi-
leged as "big government." Those who wish to curtail the role of
government precisely at a time when the U.S. economy is more
subject to international economic shifts than ever, and the U.S.
government has large projected budgetary surpluses, also preach
a form of anarchy.13' In the end, their anti-government policies
will drive more U.S. citizens that are not benefiting from the
global market to demand that the United States shut down its
borders to imports. 132 This would harm not only the United
States as a whole, but developing countries and their workers in
particular.
The WTO's future development depends, in large part, not
on whether it facilitates the use of trade restrictions, but rather
on how trade liberalization policies are coordinated with the
129. See, e.g., CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY: THE Fu-
TURE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2001).
130. See The New Trade War, ECONOMIST, Dec. 4, 1999, at 25.
131. Although the underlying political philosophies of the two groups are op-
posed, they nonetheless are linked in their opposition to centralized government and
the strengthening of international institutions. Moreover, conservative opponents to
government policies that assist the less privileged should only swell the ranks of anti-
globalization critics.
132. As the political scientist John Ruggie writes:
[Liarge segments of the American public and its leaders alike are trapped by
their own ideological predispositions, which make it difficult for them to see
the contradiction between espousing an increasingly neo-laissez-faire-attitude
toward government and the desire to safeguard the nation from the adverse
effects of increasingly denationalized economic forces. What is needed is a
new 'embedded liberalism' compromise.
JOHN RUGGIE, WINNING THE PEACE, 172-73 (1996).
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provision of environmental and social protection and adjust-
ment, domestically and internationally.
Trade negotiations at the international level traditionally in-
volve package deals based on reciprocal trade concessions.1" In
order to sustain the welfare-enhancing, non-discriminatory goals
of liberalized trade, we need to direct more attention to U.S.
domestic reciprocity packages.134 These domestic packages
should include the advancement of environmental and social
policies domestically and internationally. The question be-
comes: in return for further trade liberalization, what domestic
and international environmental and social programs will trade
liberals endorse, and how energetically will they do so? This is
what the 1999 WTO-UNEPjoint report on Trade and Environment
suggests when it states:
[Tlhere is no inherent conflict between trade and the envi-
ronment. Rather, the conflict, to the extent it exists, arises as
result of a failure of political institutions to address environ-
mental problems, especially those of a transboundary or
global nature that require a concerted effort to solve . . .
[T]he removal of economic borders and the associated in-
crease in mobility of industries, has made cooperation more
urgent . . . But this need for cooperation goes far beyond
what the WTO is cable of delivering by itself.13 5
Resolution of the W'TO's blue-green blues will require collabora-
tive initiatives of trade liberal policy networks, export-oriented
commercial interests, and labor and environmental constituen-
133. Sylvia Ostry, the former Canadian ambassador to the WTO, refers to the Uru-
guay Round of trade negotiations as the "North-South grand bargain," in which devel-
oping countries acquiesced to new services and intellectual property agreements in re-
turn for U.S. and European concessions on trade in textiles and agriculture. See Sylvia
Ostry, The Uruguay Round North-South Grand Bargain, Implications for Future Negotiations,
in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (Robert Hudec ed., 2001)
(on file with author) (noting that South now believes that it received the worse of the
"bargain"); see also David Sanger, A Grand Trade Bargain, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 65 (2001).
134. Of course, political deals are also made domestically to "buy off" different
producer interests. See, e.g., C. O'Neal Taylor, Fast Track, Trade Policy, and Free Trade
Agreements: Why the NAFIA Turned into a Battle, 28 GEO. WASH. J. lr'L L. & ECON. 2, 10-
11 (1994); Youri Devuyst, The European Union and the Conclusion of the Uruguay Round, in
3 THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 449 (Carolyn Rhodes & Sonia Mazey eds., 1995)
(concerning the payoff to Portugal for its textile industry). This Article, on the other
hand, points to the potential desirability of trade-environment, trade-labor domestic
packages within the United States. It nonetheless recognizes the political constraints
on their potential.
135. See Nordst6m & Vaughan, supra note 31, at 11, 59.
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cies. Only then will we attain the broad-based benefits that liber-
alized trade makes possible, and with them, a more positive fu-
ture for the WTO.
Yet, whatever one's position on these environmental and so-
cial policy questions-whether you believe in the virtues of lais-
sez-faire or a role for government regulation and redistribu-
tion-there is not much that the WTO alone can do about them.
While the management of blue-green trade issues has become
the greatest challenge for the WTO, it is a challenge that the
WTO is ill-equipped to handle because of this second linkage to
domestic politics in powerful states. This second under-ana-
lyzed, underlying linkage of domestic politics and international
negotiating positions is a critical part of the explanation of the
WTO's current funk of blue-green blues. The lingering ques-
tions from Seattle remain: how will the United States react to
the protests? Will it ignore them? Will it curtail trade from de-
veloping countries on "fair trade" grounds? Will it provide
greater positive assistance, domestically and internationally, to
those most at risk? Will it proceed with some combination of the
above? These remain open questions. What is clear is that U.S.
domestic politics, concerned with U.S. constituent interests, will
continue to lie at the center.
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